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Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation
by Michael Abramowicz* and John F. Duffy**

Intellectual property protects investments in the production of information, but the
literature on the topic has largely neglected one type of information that intellectual
property might protect: information about the market success of goods and services.
A first entrant into a market often cannot prevent other firms from free-riding on
information about consumer demand and market feasibility. Despite the existence of
some first-mover advantages, the incentives to be the first entrant into a market may
sometimes be inefficiently low, thereby giving rise to a net first-mover disadvantage
and discouraging innovation. Intellectual property may counteract this inefficiency
by providing market exclusivity, thus promoting earlier market entry and increasing
the level of entrepreneurial activity in the economy. The goal of encouraging market
experimentation helps to explain certain puzzling aspects of intellectual property
doctrine and provides a coherent basis for appreciating some of the current criticisms
of intellectual property rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider two similarly situated companies.

Company A is contemplating testing

thousands of materials to see if it can find one that could make standard light bulb filaments
cheaper. No one knows for sure which, if any, will work. The testing process is expected to cost
$100,000,000 and hold about a 50% chance of yielding a successful new technology. If testing
is successful and the firm gains exclusive rights to the new material over a period of years, the
firm would gain over $200,000,000. Company B, meanwhile, is considering promoting a more
efficient type of light bulb that was discovered long ago but never effectively marketed. A
marketing campaign costing $100,000,000 is expected to hold only about a 50% chance of
convincing consumers to accept the bulb, which produces a different tint of light from
conventional bulbs and, though cheaper in the long run, requires higher up-front costs. If the
campaign is successful and the firm could have exclusive rights to newly commercialized bulbs
over a period of years, the firm would reap over $200,000,000.1 The social benefits and costs of
1

We have designed the hypothetical Company B to remind readers of the experience with compact fluorescent light bulbs. The

basic technology associated with such bulbs is now much more than a half century old and thus in the public domain. See U.S.
Patent No. 2,279,635 (filed Jan. 7, 1941) (disclosing compact fluorescent bulb with coil-shaped tube and standard socket mount);
U.S. Patent No. 2,525,022 (filed Oct. 23, 1946) (disclosing light bulb having as “its principal object . . . to provide a compact
lighting unit or fixture including a tubular fluorescent lamp of circular shape which is readily mountable in many types of fixtures
designed for incandescent lamps”). By the 1980s, several companies were engaged in limited manufacturing of this type of light.
See U.S. Patent No. 4,495,443 (filed Jan. 27, 1984). Yet despite the long availability of the technology, such bulbs remained for
decades a small fraction of the market. See L.J. SANDAHL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, COMPACT FLUORESCENT LIGHTING IN
AMERICA: LESSONS LEARNED ON THE WAY TO MARKET 5.1 (2006), http://www.eere.energy.gov/buildings/info/documents/pdfs/cfl_lessons_learned_web.pdf (noting that sales of compact fluorescent bulbs in U.S. remained below 1% of screw-socket bulb
market through 2000 and that market share “jumped” to 2.1% by end of 2001). The new bulbs faced numerous marketing and
consumer information hurdles. Id. at 2.1–2.2. By the late 1990s, technological problems (which can be the subject of exclusive
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providing exclusive property right are approximately equal in these two cases.2 It makes no
economic difference whether the source of risk arises from scientific or market uncertainty. The
legal treatment, however, presents a paradox of differential treatment. Company A likely can
obtain exclusive rights, while Company B likely cannot.3 In this Article, we ask why this
differential treatment exists, and whether it should continue to be so.
Intellectual property law has long been understood as a means of encouraging the
production of information in the form of technological discoveries and creative works. Modern
intellectual property theory, however, has generally paid little attention to information arising
from market experimentation.4 Economists including leading twentieth-century champions of
free markets and modern economists studying matters as seemingly diverse as high-tech

rights) had been solved in a variety of ways, but the overarching market problems remain unsolved to this day. Existing market
barriers perhaps could be overcome with extensive “educational and marketing campaigns,” “in-store product demonstrations,”
and “guarantees or trusted labeling” to back up claims of long-lasting performance. Id. at 7.2. But with “hundreds” of competing
manufacturers, id. at 5.1, no one firm may be able to reap any significant rewards from such efforts even if they turn out to be
successful.
2

In both cases, the producer of the information may receive a small expected profit and, assuming that the demand curve has a

downward slope, consumers will collect some surplus. The benefits may not be exactly identical because success and failure
might have implications for other projects. For example, success in identifying the better material might give scientists clues
about how to search more efficiently for other new materials in the future. There are also possible social benefits to the market
experiment: Pioneering the market for more efficient lights might give other businesses more information about the potential
market for other products. The social benefits for each type of experiment might differ, but the problems of scientific and market
uncertainty are structurally the same.
3
4

See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (2006) (precluding grant of exclusive rights for non-novel subject matter).
By “market experimentation,” we mean the commercial test of a product or service that is new to the market in which it is

launched and that has uncertain prospects for commercial success. In using this definition, we mean to distinguish technological
experimentation, which could occur in a laboratory and which would test feasibility as a matter of science and engineering.

2
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entrepreneurship and economic growth in developing economies have long recognized a parallel
between market and technological experimentation.5 They have not, however, explored the
implications of that parallel. Thus, even those who support intellectual property rights have not
considered the possibility that such rights could be modified or extended to improve incentives
for market experimentation, nor have they considered the possibility that various subtle features
of current intellectual property systems may already foster market experimentation.
Modern intellectual property theory posits that market exclusivity imposes a static cost,
but the dynamic benefit of encouraging information production and dissemination may make this
cost worth bearing. This same logic applies to market experimentation. The effective launch of
a new product or service may require substantial investments. Commercial success or failure
produces information about market demand and supply upon which competitors often can free
ride. True, early experimenters will gain some “first-mover” advantages, as they also do in the
case of technological innovations. But late-entering competitors obtain two important secondmover advantages against early market experimenters. First, they do not have to bear the cost of
investing in market development.

Second, they can copy the first experimenter’s market

successes while avoiding repeating its failures.

Once such market information is created,

consumers would benefit from competition, but without a sufficient guarantee of exclusivity it
may be the case that no one will have enough incentive to undertake the risky initial investment
in developing and testing the market. Just as patents encourage risky but ultimately beneficial
technological experimentation, some form of intellectual property protection could result in a
socially beneficial increase in market experimentation and entrepreneurial activity.

5

See infra Part II.

3
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We anticipate two general objections to the argument for intellectual property for market
experimentation. The first was voiced long ago by Friedrich Hayek as a general objection to any
form of government sanctioned exclusive rights to promote innovation: the free market already
provides abundant incentives to experiment and innovate.6 This “Hayekian position” draws no
distinction between technological and market experimentation and thus would resolve the
paradox of differential treatment present in current law by abolishing intellectual property rights
for innovation generally. But the Hayekian position has remained a polar position and, while
free competition remains an important alternative to intellectual property in some
circumstances,7 all developed nations now recognize intellectual property rights as one means for
fostering technological experimentation.
The second argument maintains that even if free competition is sub-optimal in
encouraging market experimentation, the remedy of expanding intellectual property protection
will be worse than the original disease. This argument is more formidable than the Hayekian
objection. Certainly, we acknowledge that even limited, legally enforced exclusive rights may
impose significant costs on society.

However, given the fundamental similarities between

technological and market experimentation, it would be highly surprising if the optimal policy
choice for encouraging market experimentation were always to rely upon whatever natural firstmover advantages exists in a particular market and never to deploy some form of exclusive

6

A we show in Part II, the argument has its intellectual roots in the writings of Friedrich Hayek, whose defense of free market

principles stressed the ability of unregulated markets to generate information and innovation through constant and pervasive
experimentation.
7

See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (2002) (arguing that competition

and patents are alternative means for fostering innovation and that patents system should be curtailed in industries where
competition is successful in fostering sufficient degree of innovation).
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rights, even though society generally relies on a exclusive rights to encourage technological
experimentation. Moroever, we observe that exclusive rights have been, and continue to be, used
in some circumstances to encourage market experimentation. British “patents of importation”
were permissible for hundreds of years and present a very clear example of exclusivity being
used to encourage experimentation with new markets.8 Exclusive franchise agreements are
widely employed as a means by which franchisors encourage new franchisees to risk developing
a business in new geographic locations.9 Finally, recognition that market experimentation may
be a legitimate goal of intellectual property does not necessarily lead to an expansion of
intellectual property right. Since there is already patchwork, imprecise protection in the current
legal doctrine,10 a more coherent and carefully tailored system may be able to provide greater
encouragement for market experimentation while reducing the overall costs to society of existing
intellectual property rights.11
In Part III, we present our own argument that a hypothetical regime of free competition
would provide inefficiently low incentives for market experimentation. Admittedly, we are
handicapped in finding empirical support for our claim that the existing level of market
experimentation is inefficiently low, because it is difficult to measure what does not exist. There

8

See discussion in text at notes 103-105.

9
10
11

See discussion in text at notes 101-102.
See infra Part IV (discussing market experimentation in current intellectual property doctrine).
See text at note 184, infra, which argues in favor of restricting the existing doctrine that allows an innovation’s commercial

success to support the validity of patents. The alternative proposed --- limiting the doctrine so that only the patentee’s
commercial success could be used --- may provide a more clear metric for the doctrine and reduce the number of patents
permitted on relatively trivial developments that would have been marketed even without a government grant of exclusive rights.

5
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are strong theoretical arguments, though, that incentives for innovation are insufficient.
Industrial organizational scholars have long recognized that in many contexts, free entry will not
lead to socially optimal entry.12 Similarly, the literature on business management has recognized
that, while first movers enjoy significant advantages, second movers have significant advantages
too.13 Our model focuses on the ability of a market experiment to produce information of a type
generally ignored by the literature --- information about whether consumer demand and other
market conditions will permit commercial success.14 Our model shows how a system of free
12

See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON.

REV. 297, 297 & 308 (1977) (noting that, because of scale economies, a competitive market with free entry will produce a
“suboptimal” solution while “monopoly power enables firms to pay fixed costs” and thus “the relationship between monopoly
power and the direction of market distortion is no longer obvious”); N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry
and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND. J. ECON. 48, 57 (1986) (providing an intuitive foundation for appreciating “the inefficiencies
that can arise from free entry in the presence of fixed set-up costs”); Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside
Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON. 141, 154 (1979) (setting forth a model demonstrating that, under certain assumptions, the optimal policy
for regulating industrial entry could be “either free entry or entry restricted to the point of each brand having a complete
monopoly market”).
13

See, e.g., Roger A. Kerin et al., First-Mover Advantage: A Synthesis, Conceptual Framework, and Research Propositions, 56

J. MARKETING 33, 34-39 (1992) (discussing extensive economic literature about first mover advantages as well as disadvantages
and areas where more research is necessary); Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41, 42-47 (1988) (same). See also id. at 47-49 (noting that “[l]ate-movers may be able to ‘free-ride’ on a
pioneering firm’s investments in a number of areas including R&D, buyer education, and infrastructure development” and also
“gain an edge through resolution of market or technological uncertainty”); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 270 (2007) (noting that competitors entering market after initial patentee benefit from information
arising from patentee’s decisions, allowing second movers to apply knowledge obtained from publicly released patent toward
more innovative products and processes).
14

See, e.g., Michael Waldman, Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem, 54 REV. ECON.

STUD. 301 (1987) (considering uncertainty about demand in context in which members of existing oligopoly are considering
whether to take actions that might deter subsequent entry). Waldman’s analysis, however, does not consider the problem of the

6
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competition with no exclusive rights for market experiments may provide inadequate incentives
to induce socially valuable experiments such as the introduction of a new (but technologically
uninnovative) product or service or even the marketing of an old product or service to a new
geographic market. Intellectual property protection for market experimentation, we demonstrate,
can raise social welfare even if the exclusive rights impose substantial deadweight losses and are
subject to other known limitations and difficulties. The advantages of exclusive rights seem to
outweigh the disadvantages across a wide set of plausible assumptions.
Furthermore, as we show in Part IV, the goal of promoting market experimentation is not
so alien to existing intellectual property regimes as it may first seem. Perhaps as much by
accident as by design, our existing systems of intellectual property already include several
doctrines that are difficult to explain unless the relevant intellectual property rights are
recognized as partially advancing the goal of encouraging market experimentation.15

For

example, some observers have argued that productive American industry is being overrun by
“patent trolls,” companies that produce no actual products but that merely obtain and enforce
patents.16 The conventional theory of the patent system maintains that the basic quid pro quo for

first entrant into a new market.
15

F. Scott Kieff observes that patent law may promote commercialization of new technologies by offsetting second-mover

advantages, though he does not address the possibility that intellectual property might promote commercialization in the absence
of technological innovation. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 697, 708–10 (2001).
16

See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Tired of Trolls, A Feisty Chief Fights Back, New York Times, September 16, 2006, p. C1 (describing

“patent trolls” as firms that “[i]nstead of using [their patents] to build a commercial product, extract licensing fees from
companies that are making and selling real products,” and asserting that such firms are responsible for patent litigation becoming
“part of the dark underbelly of American business”); see also James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll:
An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 Emory L.J. 189, 189-90 (2006) (collecting

7
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obtaining exclusive patent rights is the disclosure of technology set forth in the patent document
itself.17 Under that theory, the concern about patent trolls seems inexplicable: Someone who
makes a sufficient disclosure and obtains a valid patent cannot be gaming the system. But if the
patent system is recognized as having mixed goals—both spurring the disclosure of
technological information and fostering actual investment in real-world market experiments—
then the concern over patent trolls makes sense. The law should be more generous to firms that
have both made technological disclosure in patent documents and risked assets in launching new
businesses based on the technology.
Existing intellectual property systems, however, do not provide well-tailored incentives
for market experimentation.

The problem is that the granting of intellectual property

protection—specifically, patents—is not dependent on the extent to which an innovation will
promote market experimentation. This holds true even with—indeed, perhaps especially with—
the modern advent of so-called business method patents.18 Such patents might be granted for
criticisms of patent trolls, which are defined as firms that “acquire[] ownership of a patent without the intention of actually using
it to produce a product”).. For a historical analysis showing that patent trolls are nothing new, see Gerard N. Magliocca,
BlackBerries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809 (2007), and for the
argument that trolls are merely traders in property rights who increase liquidity and decrease transaction costs, see McDonough,
supra, at 204-20.
17

J.E.M. Agric. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2002) (stating assumption that “[t]he disclosure required by

the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude’”)(quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484
(1974)).
18

See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (upholding business

method patent and concluding that “[s]ince the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and should have been, subject to
the same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method.”); see also sources cited supra note 7.
The availability of pure business method patents has recently been placed in doubt by the decision in In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007), see note 20, infra.
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innovations that are based on new technologies but that would have been created and marketed
even without patent protection. 19 On the other hand, such patents could be refused for being
technologically obvious, non-novel or outside the scope of patentable subject matter even though
some grant of economic exclusivity might be needed to test them in the marketplace.20 A more
reasonable system would be open to granting exclusive rights based on market rather than
technological innovation, but only in those cases where the market success s truly doubtful – in
other words, where the market success is nonobvious.
We conclude that the reason that intellectual property theory and property rights theory
fail to contemplate property protection for market experimentation is not that information about
market success is a type of information that inherently needs no protection. Rather, we argue,
they fail to contemplate it because our property rights institutions as currently designed are
poorly suited to afford such protection.

Institutional limitations have become theoretical

limitations standing in the way of our clearly conceptualizing the entire subject of intellectual
property. This Article’s theoretical ambition is to demonstrate that market experimentation can
produce information that, if institutional difficulties can be overcome, would sometimes be worth
protecting much in the same way that intellectual property is currently protected. Its practical
19

See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997) (disclosing making of online purchases with single mouse click);

see also Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that Amazon.com demonstrated
likely literal infringement but remanding for determination of whether patent met requirement of nonobviousness).
20

In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that “[i]t is thus clear that the present statute does not allow

patents to be issued on particular business systems--such as a particular type of arbitration--that depend entirely on the use of
mental processes”). The Federal Circuit’s decision in Comiskey also holds that computer implemented business methods may
remain unpatentable if the computerization of the business method is merely “the routine addition of modern electronics to an
otherwise unpatentable invention.” Id. at 1380. The court was willing to disallow issuance of the patent even if the applicant
could demonstrate “a long-felt need for the unpatentable mental process.” Id.

9
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ambition is to consider the relevance of this insight for existing intellectual property institutions
and doctrines.
The next Part discusses the economic literature on market experimentation and shows
how the differential treatment of technological and market experimentation has long presented a
puzzle to theorists.

Part IIII presents our model for why market experimentation will be

inefficiently low without protection and then discusses different types of market
experimentation. In Part IV, we show that a concern for market experimentation helps explain
several inconsistent aspects of current intellectual property doctrine and Part V concludes.
II. TECHNOLOGICAL AND MARKET EXPERIMENTATION IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT
The ability of open markets to foster entrepreneurial activity, experimentation, and
innovation has played a pivotal role in the defense of free-market economic policies for at least a
century.

We review that history here to make three points.

First, although technological

experimentation is considered distinct from market experimentation in legal doctrine, the
economic literature generally does not make the assumption that technological experiments are
inherently different from, or more in need of legal protection than, other forms of risky but
socially desirable testing.21 Second, most defenders of free markets, although they generally
view such markets as superior to government-regulated central planning as mechanisms for
fostering experimentation and innovation, have long recognized that unbridled competition is not
necessarily the optimal policy for encouraging experimentation. Indeed, free-market economists
have often confronted the problem that market experimenters may not be able to appropriate a

21

For example, economists have long considered adjustments in price, quantity, quality, contractual terms and organization to be

examples of potentially worthwhile experiments that may benefit society.
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sufficient fraction of the gains from their experimentation to justify the expense and risk of the
experiment in the first place. This “appropriability problem” has several conventional solutions,
none of which is considered complete. Third, in more recent years, some economists in various
fields—particularly those who study developing countries and entrepreneurship—have became
increasingly impatient with the traditional solutions to the appropriability problem and have
sought new means to address the problem. That group of economists, however, has tended to
accept the existing structure of intellectual property law as a given.
By reviewing how even defenders of free markets have recognized both the similarity
between technological and market experimentation and the limitations of the market in fostering
an optimal amount of experimentation, we hope to counter the intuition that competition alone is
particularly well-suited to generate experimentation in a free market.

The possibility of

intellectual property for market experimentation is a natural extension of the more recent
economic literature.
A. Free Market Experimentation and the Appropriability Problem
An intellectual connection between free markets and innovation began to be constructed
in the early twentieth century, at the inception of what would be a pitched battle between the
advocates of governmental control of industry and the defenders of the free market.22 Frank
Knight, an early leader of the Chicago school of economics, saw the encouragement of

22

The best recounting of this epic struggle is in Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle for

the World Economy. (1998). As Yergin and Stanislaw note, by the middle of the twentieth century, “[t]he Soviet Union enjoyed
an economic prestige and respect in the West that is hard to reconstruct today”; admiration came “even from conservatives”; and
“the limitations and rigidity of central planning – and, ultimately its fatal flaw, its inability to innovate – were still decades away
from being evident. Id. at 4.
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“entrepreneurship or risk-taking”—i.e., experimentation—as “the central principle of the
enterprise economy.”23 Social control of industry, he believed, was undesirable precisely because
it could diminish risk-taking, for “the real trouble with bureaucracies is not that they are rash, but
the opposite. . . . [T]hey universally show a tendency to ‘play safe’ and become hopelessly
conservative,” leading to “the arrest of progress and the vegetation of life.”24 Hayek, likewise,
thought that the true strength of the free market was its ability to make “constant deliberate
adjustments, by new dispositions made every day in light of the circumstances not known the
day before.”25 Joseph Schumpeter stressed the free market generates a “a perennial gale of
creative destruction” in which productive competition comes from “the new commodity, the new
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of an organization . . . .”26 All three saw the
dynamic process of risk-taking, experimentation, and innovation as the central strength of a free
market and figured that the phenomenon went beyond technological advances that could be
23
24
25
26

Frank H. Knight, Socialism: The Nature of the Problem, 50 ETHICS 253, 285 (1940).
Id. at 361.
F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524 (1945).
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM,

AND

DEMOCRACY 81, 84 (2d ed. 1950). Schumpeter was an unusual

defender of capitalism because he believed that the success of capitalism would ultimately lead to its demise. There are various
theories as to why he took that position. It is possible that he was seeking to influence young economists who at the time widely
believed that capitalism would soon be replaced by socialism. His prediction of capitalism’s demise could then be seen as “bait,
leading leftist intellectuals who would never pick up or take seriously the work of a more overt defender of capitalism to bite into
the book.” JERRY Z. MULLER, MIND AND THE MARKET: CAPITALISM IN WESTERN THOUGHT 307 (2003). Another possibility is that
Schumpeter truly believed that socialism would prevail, even though it “would not be as efficient as capitalism,” because it
would offer society other advantages such as greater predictability. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 324
(1980). Finally, Schumpeter’s prediction of doom may have been a call to arms for the defenders of capitalism—a position
seemingly supported by his preface to the second edition of Capital, Socialism, and Democracy. See SCHUMPETER, supra note
26, at xi (remarking that prediction of doom on sinking ship may spur crew “to rush to the pumps”).
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achieved by researchers in lab coats. Innovation was seen as encompassing generally all forms
of risk-taking and entrepreneurship, from new technology to new business organization to
minutia-laden quotidian business decisions.
Yet in championing the ability of the free market to foster experimentation and
innovation, defenders of capitalism confront a basic problem:

Precisely because the market is

free from governmental regulation, copycats are able to enter and thrive if an innovation turns
out to be successful. Their entry can drive the price of the new product or service down, thereby
benefiting consumers but reducing profits so substantially as to prevent the experimenter from
appropriating a sufficient fraction of the social gain to justify the experimenter’s expense in
undertaking the risky experiment in the first place. Thus, while individuals and firms may have
more freedom to innovate in a free market economy than under central planning, the incentive to
do so may well be insufficient.
There are various possible approaches to this appropriability problem. One derives from
Hayek’s conceptualization of experimentation as involving “small changes”—i.e., the plethora of
“day-to-day adjustments” that are conducted at low cost and produce optimal results through
multiple and repetitive incremental changes.27 Paradigmatic examples would be changes in price,
suppliers, and quantity or quality of the goods produced or ordered.28 With millions of producers
and sellers making such adjustments continually, the result may be reasonably optimal solutions
within the parameters of the existing market.

While Hayek appeared satisfied that this

mechanism for innovation would be enough, incremental change does not work in all situations.

27
28

Hayek, supra note 25, at 523.
Hayek listed such pedestrian adjustments as a firm’s decisions to buy “tiles for its roof” and “stationery for its forms.” Id. at

524.

13

MARKET EXPERIMENTATION
Small modifications to cars and trains did not lead to the airplane; little changes to aspirin did not
lead to antibiotics; and optimizing adjustments to the traditional mail system did not produce
FedEx.
Although intellectual property law is a seemingly obvious solution to the appropriability
problem, early theorists such as Knight and Schumpeter understood that the intellectual property
protections available under the current law29 could protect only a subset of the experimentation
that should be encouraged in a free market. Knight viewed trade secret law and the patent
system as important means for addressing the problem that, “owing to the low cost of
indefinitely multiplying an idea, it is usually difficult to capitalize an increase in productive
power.”30 As he summed it up, “[m]aking innovations is a gamble, and a lottery cannot function
without large prizes.”31 Knight, however, recognized that existing intellectual property law
would make it difficult for an innovator to “secur[e] any permanent gain” from an “improvement
of business organization and methods” because such an improvement was “usually neither
patentable nor capable of being kept secret.”32 He also recognized that these sorts of innovations

29

While Knight and Schumpeter wrote in first half of the twentieth century, the scope of intellectual property law has remained

largely the same through to today. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the current state of intellectual property law.
30

FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY,

AND

PROFIT 372 (Harper 1965) (1921). The desire to encourage “investment in

invention,” Knight believed, led society to “permit[] an inventor or his assigns to keep his idea secret as long as possible.” Id.
But, because secrecy was often “impracticable,” “the patent system has come into general use establishing and protecting by law
a temporary, and rather short-lived, property right in the improvement.” Id. (emphasis in original).
31
32

Knight, supra note 23, at 285.
Id.; see also id. at 341–42 (noting that patents and secrecy were possible only in certain circumstances and that “in many cases

no direct safeguards are available and the economic profitableness of the idea is limited to the period of time required for
competitors to copy the new method”).
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were a “form of progress” in which society should encourage investment.33

Yet after

thoughtfully identifying this problem, Knight largely dodged solving it. He asserted that “there
is no evidence of any unwillingness to make expenditures in this form of improvement,” even
though that “fact” was puzzling to him34 Perhaps Knight simply assumed, as have others,35 that
the large amount of market innovation precluded the possibility that there might be inefficiently
little of it.36
33

Id. (defining “the term ‘invention . . . in a broad sense” so that it includes not only “the improvement of technological

processes” but also improvements to “methods of organization, and the like”).
34
35

Id.
Robert P. Merges, Patent Law and Policy 155-56 (2d ed. 1997) ("The relatively frequent innovations in the financial services

industry prior to the era of patentability suggest that firms had adequate means to appropriate the value of their new financial
innovations.").
36

Knight speculated that perhaps trademark law provided the solution—that the investment in innovative business might “yield

a more permanent advantage through the use of distinctive brands and legal protection of trade marks and trade names.” Id. at
373. Indeed, as we will argue, trademark and trade dress law are partially tailored to protect investments in innovative
businesses. See infra Part IV.A. They may not, however, provide a complete solution to the problem, for trademark and trade
dress law have been designed primarily to identify goods to consumers and the rights conferred provide only a modest barrier to
later entrants from copying a first-mover’s success. Knight’s speculation about trademark law concluded his examination of the
problem, and even in his later writing he left unanswered the “interesting question[]” of why individuals would make sacrifices to
promote progress where the resulting advances fell into the lacunae between the protections of intellectual property. For
example, in his 1940 critique of socialism, Professor Knight asserted that
[i]nventions and technical improvements of other sorts, whether patentable or not, are in fact private property under the law of
modern industrial nations, or they certainly are such for the purposes of economic analysis as long as the person who makes an
innovation is in a position to derive any income from it in excess of the necessary remuneration of the productive agencies
employed in putting it into effect.
Knight, supra note 23, at 283–84. Yet Knight did not explain how a person would obtain that necessary remuneration if the
invention were not legally protected. See also Frank H. Knight, Discussion, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 63, 65 (1954) (recognizing that
any “new product or other departure” from existing status quo “involves risk” and therefore “must yield an excess, a monopoly
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Schumpeter’s solution to the appropriability problem looked not to intellectual property
but to market structure. Schumpeter mentions patents and trade secrets only to remind readers
that these are “only special cases of a larger class” of the “protecting devices” that are necessary
complements to investment in entrepreneurial action.37 The protecting devices were various
ways, “which most economists condemn,” for obtaining and maintaining a monopolistic or
oligopolist position.38 Schumpeter believed the appropriability problem would be diminished if a
market, rather than being perfectly competitive, was dominated by a few large firms or even by
monopoly.39 The short-term cost to society would come in terms of diminished competition, but
the long-term benefit would be greater innovation.
To a modern observer, Schumpeter’s emphasis on market structure seems strange, since
modern literature—even that which expressly builds on Schumpeter—views large firms as a
potential threat to innovation precisely because they may lose their entrepreneurial powers of
innovation and become very good imitators that “effectively barricade[] [the industry] from the
entry and growth of small innovators.”40 Moreover, the assumption that large firms would be
more innovative than small ones seems contrary to entire experience of innovation in, for

return, over some period to cover costs,” but failing to investigate whether existing legal structures afforded successful novelties
monopoly return over optimal period).
37

SCHUMPETER, supra note 26, at 88. A similar theme can be seen in some of Professor Knight’s later writings. See, e.g., Frank

H. Knight, Free Society: Its Basic Nature and Problem, 57 PHIL. REV. 39, 52 (1948) (asserting that “a great deal of other
monopoly is essentially of the same nature” as patent system because monopoly provides “a stimulus to devising and introducing
useful innovations”).
38
39
40

SCHUMPETER, supra note 26, at 102.
Id. at 101.
RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 367 (2006).
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example, the Silicon Valley economy.41

Consequently, modern innovation policy tends to

remain agnostic about industrial structure. Government, it is generally thought, should reward
innovation without regard to whether the innovation is produced by a small start-up like Google
a decade ago or giant firm such as Google today.
Schumpeter realized that the conventional vision of intellectual property was incapable of
covering all the experimentation that firms could engage in. Thus, his emphasis on market
structure makes sense, if intellectual property rights are assumed to be significantly limited in
their effectiveness.

Indeed, Schumpeter’s emphasis on market structure spawned an entire

literature on the connection between market structure and innovation, a striking aspect of which
is, in retrospect, how little attention is given to the possibility that intellectual property rules
might be modified to address the basic appropriability problem.42 The next section reviews what
progress, although small, has been made in the direction of adapting intellectual property rules.

41

The empirical support for a correlation between industrial concentration and innovation was always viewed as problematic.

See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen & Steven Klepper, A Reprise of Size and R & D, 106 ECON. J. 925, 925–26 (1996) (noting the long
controversy over whether large firms are more innovative than small); F.M. Scherer, Market Structure and the Employment of
Scientists and Engineers, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 524, 530 (1967) (concluding that the relationship between industrial concentration
and innovation is “complex” and that where industry concentration becomes too high, further concentration “is probably not
conducive to more vigorous technological efforts and may be downright stultifying”).
42

For example, Nelson and Winter include extensive discussions of market structure in facilitating innovation and economic

evolution, and yet intellectual property and the patent system are barely mentioned. Neither rates an entry in the book’s index.
Id. at 433-35. Patent policy is mentioned infrequently because it is seen merely as one variable affecting the rate of industrial
imitation. See id. at 332 (noting that patent policy can make imitation “hard or easy”). The imitation rate is assumed to be one
policy that can influence firm size, see id. (noting other policies that can influence industrial structure), which, in turn, is assumed
to address the appropriability problem associated with innovation, see id. at 279 (assuming appropriability advantages of large
firms over small ones where patent protection is spotty and imitation occurs rapidly). Nelson and Winter thus view patent policy
as “indirectly” affecting market structure, and market structure as affecting appropriability. Id. at 332. A wide swath of literature
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B. Modern Rethinking of Market Experimentation
More recent economic writing has shown a great willingness to conceive of economic
ventures in virtually the same terms as experiments in engineering or technology. This modern
literature—especially the literature on entrepreneurship and developing economies—takes the
congruence of market and engineering experimentation nearly to its logical conclusion. We say
“nearly” because, while the literature recognizes that exclusivity can foster market
experimentation, it does not consider whether property rights should be extended to protect the
fruits of such experiments. Perhaps because they are not trained in the law, economists seem
timid in recommending changes to the law. Instead, they take the law largely as a given—as a
constraint—and focus their attention on how market institutions respond to those constraints.
A good example is found in the writings of Professors Shane and Venkataraman, two
leading scholars in the study of entrepreneurship. Following in the tradition of Schumpeter,
Shane and Venkataraman recognize entrepreneurship as “the crucial engine” driving change in a
capitalist society.

They also recognize that entrepreneurship is tied to the production and

takes a similar approach, considering industry structure to be one of the most important determinants of innovation. See, e.g.,
Morton I. Kamien & Nancy L. Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey, 13 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 2-3 (1975)
(noting that “[f]ew, if any economists maintain that perfect competition efficiently allocates resources for technical advance” and
that among those “who contend that an imperfectly competitive market system is the best alternative” for encouraging
innovation, the literature tends to focus on testing hypotheses “involve[ing] the relationships between R&D activity and firm
size”); Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q. J. ECON. 395, 395 (1979) (positing “the existence of a degree of
concentration intermediate between pure monopoly and atomistic (perfect) competition that is best in terms of R & D
performance”); Edwin Mansfield, Size of Firm, Market Structure, and Innovation, 71 J. POL. ECON. 556, 556 (1963) (noting that
“[i]n recent years economists have become increasing interested” in determining “the effects of an industry’s market structute on
its rate of technical progress”); Oliver E. Williamson, Innovation and Market Structure, 73 J. POL. ECON. 67, 67-68 (1965)
(focusing attention on the factors by which firm size might be thought to affect innovative performance). The alternative is to
consider intellectual policy as a direct means of addressing the appropriability problem.
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exploitation of new information and expressly note that the opportunities for entrepreneurship
“need not be restricted to the technological developments.”43 The information generated by
entrepreneurship is seen as having an appropriability problem: The new “information diffuses to
other members of society who can imitate the innovator and appropriate some of the innovator’s
entrepreneurial profit.”44 Yet the legal structure addressing the appropriability problem is
accepted as a given, so Shane and Venkataram view entrepreneurial activity as depending upon
factors such as “[t]he provision of monopoly rights, as occurs with patent protection or an
exclusive contract,” and “the slowness of information diffusion or the lags in the timeliness with
which others recognize information.”45
Similarly, another leader in entrepreneurial economics, Mark Casson, draws a creative
connection between patents and the exclusive charters granted to English trading companies in
the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries. Casson recognizes that the exclusive trading
“charter conferred on the company can be regarded as the equivalent of a patent conferred on a
technical innovation” because the charter “rewarded pioneers who collected valuable information
about new overseas sources of supply.”46 Such rewards, Casson recognizes, “were necessary to
compensate for the considerable costs that were sunk in collecting this information,” and without
the exclusive charter, the “private rewards would have been dissipated by competition.”47 Yet
elsewhere Casson accepts that, unlike scientific inventions, “[i]nformation about opportunities
43

Scott Shane & S. Venkataraman, The Promise of Entrepreneurship as a Field of Research, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 217, 219–

20 (2000).
44
45
46
47

Id. at 221.
Id.
MARK CASSON, INFORMATION AND ORGANIZATION 245–46 (Oxford 1997).
Id.
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for trade . . . cannot be patented.”48 He then considers the implications of that legal constraint
on observable traits of firms but does not consider the possibility of eliminating or relaxing it.
Other writers have taken a similar approach, viewing economic experiments as similar to
technologic experiments but then considering the implications of that insight solely in terms of
how it will affect the structure of firms.49
Perhaps the most insightful of the modern literature is found in the field of development
economics. For example, Ricardo Hausmann and Dani Rodrik of Harvard precisely describe the
basic problem of market experimentation when they note that “[i]f learning what a country is
good at producing requires an investment and the returns to that investment cannot be fully
appropriated, the problem faced by potential entrepreneurs in developing countries is identical to
the problem faced by innovators in the advanced industrial countries.”50

Moreover, they

recognize that “the policy environments facing the ‘innovators’ in the two settings are quite
different” because the innovator in the developed country can typically obtain intellectual
property, which “protects discoverers of new goods through . . . patents,” but “the investor in
the developing country who figures out that an existing good can be produced profitably at home
does not normally get such protection, no matter how high the social return.”51

48
49

Id.
See, e.g., Kirsten Foss & Nicolai Foss, Organizing Economic Experiments: Property Rights and Firm Organization, 15 REV.

AUSTRIAN ECON. 297, 298–299 (2002).
50
51

Indeed,

Ricardo Hausmann & Dani Rodrik, Economic Development as Self-Discovery, 72 J. DEV. ECON. 603, 605 (2003).
Id.
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developing countries are usually encouraged to promote competition and lower the barriers of
entry, but “free entry makes the non-appropriability problem worse.”52
Nevertheless, despite the crispness with which they identify the problem, the authors
consider only conventional policy tools, e.g., “trade protection, public sector credit, tax holidays,
and investment and export subsidies”,53 as possible remedies in the developing world. As with
the literature concerning developed economies, scholars in the field have generally overlooked
the possibility that intellectual property rights might be tailored to address the appropriability
problem. In Part IV, this Article considers that possibility directly. First, though, we present
models of the economic ramifications of the existing problem and quantify the potential benefits
of resolving it.
III. MODELING THE MARKET EXPERIMENTATION PROBLEM
Justice Holmes’s famous defense of free speech insists “that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”54 The marketplace
analogy works because of a general assumption that markets at least succeed in sorting good and
bad business ideas. Indeed, we agree with Schumpeter that markets facilitate the process of
creative destruction, ultimately promoting economic growth.55 Neither legal nor economic
scholarship, however, pays much attention to the question of whether the degree of marketplace
experimentation is optimal.

52
53
54
55

This Part will seek to identify various reasons that market

Id.
Id.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See generally SCHUMPETER, supra note 26.
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experimentation may be suboptimal, while also acknowledging that there might be some factors
pushing in the other direction. The possibility that entry into markets may not be perfectly
calibrated is nothing new. The economic literature on imperfect competition has long recognized
that there might be too little or too much entry into particular markets.56 What differentiates our
analysis from previous inquiries is, first, that we focus on entry into new markets and, second,
that we emphasize the uncertainty of success and the entrepreneur’s inability to prevent others
from free-riding on information produced by market experimentation. Ultimately, though, our
story describes a familiar market failure: Because market experimentation produces the positive
externality of information, it is underproduced in the market.
A. A Model
1. The wedge between social and private benefit
Our principal claims are twofold. One, even where there are significant first-mover
advantages, market experiments that would be socially useful may not be in the interest of any
private party. Two, increasing the degree of market exclusivity – in effect, providing legal
protection to increase the first-mover advantage -- can promote social welfare by increasing the
number of experiments that private parties are willing to undertake. To gain an appreciation of
how large the wedge between social optimality and private incentives might be, let us consider a
simple model, which we will develop by starting with the following baseline set of assumptions:
A new business concept may end in success or failure. If it ends in failure, the first entrant’s
entire startup cost (assume for now $1,000,000) will be lost. If it is successful, then there will be
56

See sources cited supra note 12. For an analysis of the implications of inefficient entry in the copyright context, see Michael

Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33 (2004).
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some gross social benefit from the experiment (assume $5,000,000). Some portion of this social
benefit (assume 50%) will be captured by the combination of the first entrant and the subsequent
entrants, while consumers capture the rest, paying less for the service provided than the
maximum that they would be willing to pay. Additional businesses may enter the market if the
concept is successful for some cost (assume $1,000,000 for this cost also). The number of
businesses that will enter is the maximum possible without producing losses.57
The first entrant will capture some expected share of the rents, while the other entrants
share the remaining rents.58 Let us suppose, for example, that the first entrant expects to be able
to capture 60 percent of the rents if the experiment is successful, while all other entrants would
share the remaining 40 percent of rents. (The 60/40 split between the first and subsequent
entrants is arbitrarily selected but does represent a case in which the first entrant enjoys a
considerable first-mover advantage over all subsequent entrants.) Because we have assumed that
consumers capture half of the social benefit, the total rents available to all potential entrants are
$2,500,000, so the first entrant’s expected rent in the event of success is $1,500,000, and the first
entrant’s expected profit would be $500,000. The market would then support one additional
entrant, and the net social benefit would be $3,000,000 (the $5,000,000 in gross social benefit
minus the total entry costs of $2,000,000). In the event of failure, the first entrant’s loss would
57

To simplify the diagrams, our model allows a fractional number of additional firms to enter the market once one firm has

entered. This can be conceived in expected value terms, so that entry of 2.5 firms could be interpreted as equal probabilities that
2 and 3 firms will enter the market. The step function discontinuity needlessly complicates the analysis, but allowing for only
integral entry would not change any of our conclusions. A spreadsheet that can be modified to view of the graphs here, as well as
a variation on each of them in the absence of fractional entry, is available from the authors.
58

In referring to “rents” here, we mean to include all returns that exceed the firms’ operating costs, including opportunity costs,

once they have entered the market. These rents may include quasi-rents representing merely ordinary economic returns on the
sunk cost investments necessary to enter the market.
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be the full $1,000,000 that was risked on performing the market experiment. If there is at least a
25 percent or one-quarter chance of success, then this experiment will be socially beneficially,
because at that level the expected social benefit (0.25 * $3,000,000) will just equal the expected
cost from failures (0.75 * $1,000,000). From the perspective of the potential first entrant,
however, there must be at least an 66⅔ percent or two-thirds chance of success to make the
experiment worthwhile. At that level, the expected private benefit of success (⅔ * $500,000)
just equals the expected private cost of failure (⅓ * $1,000,000).
Figure 1 will consider the full range of possible values of the first entrant’s expected
share of the rents. The first entrant can receive anywhere from 0 (in which case success is no
better than failure) to 1 (monopoly). The graph illustrates the minimum expected probability of
success that will be needed for the experiment to be socially and privately beneficial for different
possible values of the first entrant’s expected share. The x-axis reports the first entrant’s
expected share of rents (in present discounted value), while the y-axis reports the minimum
expected probability of success for there to be a private benefit and a social benefit.
Straightforwardly, the private benefit curve has a downward slope; with a higher expected
proportion of the rents contingent on success, a lower success probability will be sufficient to
induce market entry. Thus, as the first entrant enjoys a greater first-mover advantage (either
from market conditions or legal protections), more risky but nonetheless socially valuable
experiments will occur. There is also a slight downward slope to the social benefit curve. This
is because when the share of the rents enjoyed by the first entrant rises, there is less duplicative
expenditure for entry by additional entrants.
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Figure 1: Probability of success needed for experimentation to be socially and privately
beneficial
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The gap between the social success and the private success lines reveals the market
failure. Continuing the previous example, if the expected probability of success is anywhere
between 25% and 66 ⅔ %, the experiment will be worthwhile socially but will not be attempted.
For expected probabilities of success below 25%, the market failure makes no difference,
because the experiment will be neither socially nor privately worthwhile.

For expected

probabilities of success above 66 ⅔ %, it also makes no difference, as the private party will
undertake the experiment and it will be socially beneficial. Whether a market failure occurs thus
depends on the first entrant’s expected share of the rents and the expected probability of success.
The overall magnitude of this type of market failure over the economy depends on the
distribution of these numbers across all potential projects. If we live in a world in which all
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potential projects have either very low or very high probabilities of success, and the first
entrant’s expected share of rents is sufficiently high, then the market failure might seem likely to
make little difference. Empirical measurement of course is impossible—there is no way to
identify all of the potential projects that no one undertakes—but it seems plausible that there are
many potential projects in range of the middling probabilities.
Our model is relatively simple, but our fundamental conclusion so far—that a
considerably higher expected probability of success is needed to make experimentation privately
feasible than to make it socially beneficial—is relatively robust to our assumptions. Figure 2
illustrates the effect of changing many of the numeric parameters. As shown in Figure 2A,
reducing the cost of the initial entry narrows the gap between the private and social minimum
probability curves, because lower initial entry costs make the cost of the experiment less
worrisome, while raising the cost of the initial entry increases the gap. Decreasing or increasing
the cost of entry for subsequent entrants (as in Figure 2B) has only modest change on either
effects line. Increasing the gross social benefit in the case of success (Figure 2C) decreases the
gap, because the upside of the experiment becomes more attractive, while reducing the gross
social benefit increases the gap. The only possible change that would significantly alter our
conclusions would be increasing the proportion of social benefit captured by entrants to near 1.0
(Figure 2D). At this level, rent-seeking eliminates the portion of the social benefit not captured
by the initial entrant, and so the private and social benefit of experimentation are virtually
aligned. We find it doubtful, however, that firms will be able to achieve the perfect price
discrimination that full private capture of social benefits would require. Reducing the proportion
of social benefits captured by entrants (thus increasing the portion captured by consumers)
correspondingly increases the gap between private and social benefit.
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Figure 2. Effects of changing parameters of model
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It might appear that our model is inconsistent with the common observation that many
new businesses fail.59 There are two explanations for why risky businesses are still able to attract
investment. First, investors who specialize in high risk opportunities -- venture capitalists -- will
be willing to tolerate high risk in fields where first mover advantages are strong. Thus, we
would expect investors to tolerate risk in those industries where various factors – including
traditional intellectual property rights like patents, copyrights and trademarks – provide
significant first-mover advantages, and in fact, the high-tech community of entrepreneurs and
their capitalists have in fact developed a well-documented toleration for failure.60 Second,

59

Venture capitalists select investments with a high possibility of return, but also take large risks with the investments. Because

venture capitalists invest in business in or close to the start-up phase, venture capitalists do not have prior histories to evaluate the
possibility of success of each business. Therefore, venture capitalists are willing to accept the fact that many of their investments
fail because the investments that succeed make huge profits. See Tyzoon T. Tyebjee & Albert V. Bruno, A Model of Venture
Capitalist Investment Activity, 30 MGMT. SCI. 9, 1051, 1052 (1984).
60

See,

e.g,

Augustin

Landier,
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www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/stigma9_augustinlandier.pdf). .
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projects having high social and private benefits will also be able to attract capital even without
strong first mover advantages. Consider Figure 3. In this figure, the cost of initial entry is
$5,000,000, and the cost of subsequent entry is $3,000,000, and the gross social benefit if the
project is successful is $100,000,000. Even if the first entrant is expected to earn only a third of
the available private rents if success occurs, investing in the first mover should be profitable even
if the likelihood of success is well below 50%. Thus, we do not deny that, under the current
legal regime, risky entrepreneurial businesses will be funded under certain industrial conditions
and for certain high-valued projects. Our point is merely that encouraging even more risky
entrepreneurial activity might be socially beneficial.

Figure 3. Probabilities of success needed when potential payout is very high
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This might appear to be an incomplete answer to the objection. Venture capitalists would
fund all projects over the private benefit line, and so it might seem that many of these projects

29

MARKET EXPERIMENTATION
would have high expected probabilities of success and only a few might be close to the breakeven point. But projects with high probability projects are likely not to exist often, because some
venture capitalist will have funded them earlier, when they were only slightly above the private
benefit line. Shifting from a static to a dynamic model makes this point clearly. Let us suppose
that if a project is successful in year 0, the gross social benefit will be $500,000 in that year,
rising 5% each year, and the discount rate is 10%. The market experiment will still occur
eventually, but it will be delayed. Figure 4 illustrates this. The x-axis is now time, and the
variable previously on the x-axis, the first entrant’s expected share of rents, is now assumed to be
0.5.

The precise amount of delay depends on the expected probability of success; if, for

example, the probability were 0.1, then the experiment will occur twenty years too late. Our
conclusion that entry will tend to occur inefficiently late is robust to plausible changes in the
parameters.61

61

This result is in contrast to an existing dynamic model of sequential entry in a growing market, by David Mills. See David E.

Mills, Untimely Entry (Product Entry on the Market), 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 659 (1991). In his model, a firm will enter when it
anticipates that entry will be profitable, taking into account all of the decisions by subsequent entrants. Id. at 662–63. Mills’s
model shows that from a social perspective, entry can be premature or tardy. The intuition underlying premature entry is that a
firm entering knows that no other firm will enter until demand has grown sufficiently to make entry worthwhile. While the firm
might wait if it had a property right that allowed it to do so, the benefit of deterring entry by other firms may make early entry
worthwhile. Id. at 660. The entrant accepts early losses for higher profits in a later period. Mills’s analysis, however, assumes
that potential entrants know the level of demand. Id. at 661 (defining an inverse demand function). At least when demand is
highly uncertain, premature entry seems unlikely to occur, though the benefit of deterring subsequent entrants for a time in the
event of modest success may to some extent reduce the wedge between the private and social benefits of entry.
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Figure 4. Delayed market experimentation in a dynamic model
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2. The effect of intellectual property protection
A principal effect of intellectual property protection is to increase the first entrant’s
expected share of the rents. This is so for two reasons. First, exclusive rights provided by
intellectual property guarantee at least a limited period of time in which the entrant faces no
direct competition at all, thus increasing the first entrant’s expected share of rents in terms of
present discounted value. Second, the head start provided by an exclusive right may allow the
first entrant to maintain a larger market share even after the limited term is complete. Moving to
the right on the x-axes in Figures 1, 2, and 3 decreases the gap between private and social
benefit, the latter of which falls slowly as a result of the decrease in rent-seeking associated with
reduced entry. For relatively small expected market shares, a private party will be unwilling to
undertake the experiment even if success is ensured, but as expected rents approach the
monopoly level, experimentation becomes increasingly feasible.
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It might appear that the conclusion that greater intellectual property will increase
experimentation flows from a simplification in our model, namely the assumption that the gross
social benefit is fixed regardless of the expected share of rents of the first entrant. After all, a
central drawback of intellectual property rights is that they increase deadweight loss, as higher
prices mean that some who value goods over marginal cost nonetheless will not purchase them.62
Indeed, we agree that a principal cost of increasing the first entrant’s expected share of rents is
this deadweight loss. Accounting for the negative effect of market power on social benefit,
however, does not diminish the point that there will be a gap between private and social
incentives for experimentation.

Figure 5 illustrates this, calculating discounted net social

benefits for different market shares of the first entrant. In addition to the assumptions of the
dynamic model in Figure 4, this graph reflects that, as the market share of the first entrant
increases from 0 to 1, deadweight loss consumes up to 40% of the gross social benefit, and the
proportion of social benefit captured by all entrants rather than by consumers increases from 0.5
to 0.75.

62

The argument that intellectual property generally creates deadweight losses is well accepted in the literature. See, e.g., Mark

A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1059 (2005) (“By definition, . . . the
intellectual property system permits owners to raise price above marginal cost, creating deadweight losses by raising the price to
consumers.”).

32

MARKET EXPERIMENTATION
Figure 5: Net social benefits as a function of first entrant’s expected share of rents, where
increase in first entrant’s share of expected rents increases deadweight loss and producers’
share of surplus
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In Figure 5, the social benefit from experimentation rises consistently with increases in
the first entrant’s expected share of rents, although the increase levels off somewhat when the
expected share exceeds 45%. Given that this figure reflects a relatively pessimistic assumption
about deadweight loss, it appears likely that the dynamic benefit of intellectual property for
market experimentation (more experimentation) will outweigh the static cost (higher prices and
lower output) in expected value terms. That does not necessarily mean, however, that increases
in intellectual property for market experimentation will always be justified. There may be other
costs of high expected rent shares besides the short-term deadweight loss, including losses from
political rent-seeking63 and a reduction in downstream market experimentation.64 Let us suppose

63

Richard Posner has argued that political rent-seeking can be “a larger source of social costs than private monopoly.” Richard

A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 807 (1975). For the classic articles introducing
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that these losses, plus the deadweight loss, equal 60% of gross social benefit from
experimentation as the first entrant’s market share approaches the monopoly level of 1.0. Then,
past a certain point, increases in expected rent shares will decrease social welfare, as illustrated
in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Social benefit where deadweight and other losses approach 60% as first entrant
approaches monopoly
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This suggests that any institution that seeks to grant intellectual property for market
experimentation must seek to limit the total costs of monopoly. Below, we will adopt an
especially

cautious

approach,

embracing

intellectual

property

only

where

market

the problem of rent-seeking, see Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291
(1974), and Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
64

Critics of the current patent system argue that the rising cost of litigation and the declining quality of patents issued by the

PTO have resulted in uncertainty and have therefore deterred investment in innovation and intellectual property. See NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 95 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004).
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experimentation seems highly unlikely to occur in its absence over the entire period of the
intellectual property right.
B. Caveats
1. Cognitive factors
In our analysis above, we assumed that although the prospective entrepreneur does not
know whether a particular project will be successful, he accurately measures its probability of
success. Behavioral economics, however, suggests that many economic actors are overconfident
about their probability of success in many endeavors, including business. Studies suggest, for
example, that failure rates of new entrants are high,65 and some have even suggested that, on
average, entry tends to produce negative economic returns.66 Of course, these conclusions are
based on private returns rather than social returns, and our analysis suggests that entrant
overoptimism may be socially beneficial, because it will tend to reduce the wedge between
private and social benefit seen in Figures 1 and 2.
Entrant overconfidence may thus reduce the benefits of intellectual property, but we
doubt that this problem is sufficiently large to undermine our general argument in any significant
way. While some individuals start businesses with their own money, many individuals use
external sources of financing. Financiers have incentives not to be overly confident about the
likelihood of success, and there is considerable evidence of realism from the venture capital side

65

David de Meze and Clive Southey, The Borrower’s Curse: Optimism, Finance and Entrepreneurship, 106 Econ. J. 375, 377

(1996) (reporting the “extremely high drop our rates” for new entrepreneurs in both the United States and Britain).
66

See, e.g., Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV.

482, 490–92 (2002).
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with regard to concerns of imitation in the market.67 The gatekeeping function of venture
capitalists thus prevents many individuals from launching quixotic business ventures or
continuing them in the case of follow-on financing. The possibility of entrant overconfidence
may thus be greatest for projects that do not receive venture capital but instead are financed by
entrepreneurs along with family and friends. Such projects tend to have lower market-entry
costs which our model predicts will have higher rates of failure to begin with.
2. Demand diversion
So far, we have assumed that the market into which the entrepreneur is considering
entering is entirely isolated from other markets. Virtually all products and services, however, are
at least partial substitutes for other goods and services. A new product or service will owe part
of any success that it achieves to customers who otherwise would have purchased other products
and services. In the industrial organization literature on product differentiation, this phenomenon
is called “demand diversion,” or, more vividly, “business stealing.”68 More commonly, this is
simply called “competition,” but the economic literature on imperfect competition shows that

67

See de Meza and Southey, supra note __, at 375 (noting that banks may have better access to unbiased information than do

entrepreneurs); id. at 377 (citing data showing that firms having financing – especially unsecured financing – fail less frequently
than those business seflf-financed by the entrepreneur). For further accounts of the skepticism by which venture capitalists
evaluate projects, see Gary Rivlin, Relax, Bill Gates; It's Google's Turn as the Villain, NY TIMES, August 24, 2005 ("When I
meet with venture capitalists, or if I'm engaged in a conversation about going into partnership with someone, inevitably the
question is, 'Why couldn't Google do what you're doing?'); Rob Landley, A Look at Microsoft's Record: Can it Continue this
Way?, www.fool.com, Nov. 18, 1998, available at http://www.fool.com/CashKing/1998/CashKingPort981118.htm (“These days,
even venture capital is drying up for any new projects that might, conceivably, someday compete with Microsoft.”).
68

See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 697

(2005) (defining “demand diversion” as “surplus cannibalized from other producers already in the market”).
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competition does not automatically produce optimal entry.69 The literature demonstrates that
because market entrants often do not take into account the effect of their entry on others already
in the market, it is possible that there will be insufficient entry or excessive entry into new
markets.70 If there is excessive entry into a market, then intellectual property protection will
have two competing effects. On the one hand, such protection may reduce subsequent entry,
potentially improving efficiency; on the other, it may make more attractive the creation of a new
differentiated product that would receive protection, potentially reducing efficiency.
Both of these competing effects are visible in Figure 7. This figure reflects, in addition to
the assumption of Figure 5, the assumption that 75% of what is counted as social benefit in that
Figure should not be so counted, for it merely reflects diversion of economic activity from
elsewhere in the economy. With this pessimistic assumption, there is excessive rather than
inadequate entry, and an increase in the share of rents earned by the first entrant initially causes
progressively greater social losses. Past a certain point, however, cost savings are obtained by
virtue of a reduction in subsequent entry, and at some point, the market experiment becomes
socially beneficial rather than harmful. Extreme demand diversion can, in sum, potentially
complicate the case for protecting market experimentation.

Ideally, an institution granting

intellectual property rights for market experimentation should be attentive to this concern.

69
70

See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 56, at 39.
See sources cited supra note 12.
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Figure 7: Social benefit with high demand diversion

20,000,000.00

Discounted net social benefit

15,000,000.00
10,000,000.00
5,000,000.00
0.00
0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

0.80

0.90

-5,000,000.00
-10,000,000.00
-15,000,000.00
-20,000,000.00
-25,000,000.00
First entrant's share of expected rents

C. Types of Market Experimentation
So far, our model has been mostly abstract, identifying a benefit of market experiments
without specifying the type of market experiments we might wish to encourage. In this section,
we discuss four different types of experiments: launching a new type of good or service (a new
product market), creating a new variety of an existing good or service (a new product feature),
reforming an organizational or supply chain (a new supply-side approach), and selling an
existing good or service in a new location (a new geographical market).
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1. New product markets
Suppose that the year is around 1997, and a venture capitalist is listening to Reed
Hastings pitch a company that he hopes to launch.71 The company, to be called NetFlix, will rent
DVDs by mail, placing them in envelopes to subscribers who select the movies over the Internet.
Hastings initially plans to rent DVDs for a fixed price for a set period of time, but eventually
may offer a deal in which subscribers can rent an unlimited number of movies for a fixed fee, so
long as they have no more than a set number, such as three, out at any given time. The venture
sounds risky. DVDs themselves are not yet a firmly established technology, and they might
break or get scratched when shipped in flimsy envelopes in the mail. Consumers might prefer
the spontaneity of a visit to the video store over ordering a movie for a later time. Late fees, on
which video rental stores have traditionally made a great deal of money, will not be a revenue
source. Building a distribution center to process the envelopes could be expensive, and ideally
there would be multiple distribution centers to minimize shipping time.

Subscriber-based

businesses typically take a long time to build, and yet the technology may have little long-term
viability given the continued expansion of broadband capacity and video on demand services.
Worst of all, imagine that this new business manages to overcome all of these obstacles.
Its success and happy customers would be difficult to hide. Competitors could then jump into
the business; indeed, they might have significant advantages over NetFlix. The Blockbuster
video chain, for example, might be able to undercut NetFlix by exploiting its existing
relationships with movie studios. Blockbuster also might take advantage of its many individual
store locations by sending DVDs from them, thereby reducing the time of mail delivery, or by
offering subscribers a chance to rent videos at Blockbuster’s bricks-and-mortar stores as part of a
71

See generally Gary Rivlin, Does the Kid Stay in the Picture?, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005 (providing background on NetFlix).
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package. Retailing giants, rich in customer brand recognition and relationships, also might
compete. Wal-Mart might be able to destroy NetFlix in much the same way that it outmuscles
mom-and-pop retailers. Massive online retailers, like Amazon.com or Dell, might crush NetFlix
simply by executing the concept more effectively.72 A back-of-the-envelope calculation might be
that there is only a one-in-three chance that the NetFlix concept initially will be successful and,
further, a one-in-three chance of maintaining a sufficient market share to be more than
marginally profitable. With an initial cost of perhaps $100 million and small margins on each
potential subscriber, the best case scenario would require a multi-billion-dollar consumer market
for the investment to be worthwhile in expected value terms.
Because NetFlix was launched and emerged as successful despite the long odds against it,
it might seem to be a poor example with which to advance our thesis. But in fact Netflix
highlights the importance of having some protection against second-movers, and the riskiness of
new businesses, even though that become highly successful.

NetFlix faced many of the

uncertainties that plague any new entrant and that provide an advantage to second-movers:
uncertainty about demand (would consumers be interested?), uncertainty about supply (how
expensive would it be to turn around DVDs?), and uncertainty about competition (would
incumbents have cost advantages?). However, the business that NetFlix sought to create may
also have enjoyed some important practical and legal first-mover protections. Once Netflix built

72

A critic has argued that Dell succeeds by identifying the best business models and then simply executing them better than the

originators of those models. See Andrew Park & Peter Burrows, Dell, the Conqueror, BUS.WK., Sept. 24, 2001. Improving
execution of existing ideas is an important type of innovation in itself, but such business practices may discourage others from
creating new business models at all. If property rights in new business models existed, then those with the best ideas could
consolidate their efforts with those best capable of conducting experiments and those best able to execute the models that have
proven at least preliminarily successful.
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large distribution centers, it was difficult for other start-up competitors to compete in selection
and delivery time. Moreover, NetFlix would also have enjoyed other network effects and
positive consumer associations with its brand name. Now, the large installed customer base73
may make a customer more likely to choose NetFlix than an alternative, both because NetFlix is
likely to be the first company that comes to mind and because the large customer base may
improve the usability of the NetFlix product. For example, having more customers may have
enabled NetFlix to develop a better database from which to make product recommendations
based on collaborative filtering for future customers.
In addition, Netflix also sought and obtained some broad and controversial patents on its
business methods. These patents may have given investors some additional degree of confidence
that Netflix could hold off the competition long enough to earn sufficient profits to justify the
risky investment, and in fact, Netflix did restore to suing on its patents when Blockbuster
attempted to enter its business.74 Yet Netflix’s patents were sought and obtained prior to recent
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit rulings that have made it more difficult to patents on
technologically obvious business methods,75 and the Netflix patents themselves were
controversial precisely because they seemed to cover a technologically trivial process of

73

Netflix is the largest rental subscription service with over 6,300,000 subscribers. Netflix, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1

(Feb. 28, 2007).
74

See Monica Sanders, Why is Netflix Suing Blockbuster? (available at www.legalzoom.com/legal-articles/netflix-suing-

blockbuster.html).
75

See, e.g., KSR v. Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007) (overturning the Federal Circuit’s more liberal teaching-suggestion-

motivation standard of patentability); In re Comiskey, __ F.3d ___ (2007) (holding that business methods may be obvious and
therefore unpatentable where they merely combine unpatentable business methods with computers or other well-known
technology).
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providing DVDs by mail.76 We have two views on the Netflix patents. In general, we support
limiting patents to nonobvious developments, and we are skeptical that Netflix’s patents could
survive scrutiny under traditional patent law standards. On the other hand, we believe that
Netflix’s launch of its business was truly risky, and therefore we think that Netflix’s patents may
have been socially useful in encouraging experimentation even though they are of doubtful
validity under traditional analysis.
NetFlix also advances our thesis because it is an example of a business that easily might
not have been, but for the persistence of its multimillionaire founder, venture capitalists who
trusted him in part on the basis of his past business success, and the possibility of sufficient legal
and non-legal first-mover advantages if the venture was successful. We cannot with certainty
identify business ideas that would have been successful if only they had been implemented, but
we can show how even businesses that proved to be phenomenally successful may at one time
have appeared to be marginal projects or likely losers. Remarkably, even after NetFlix took off
against the odds, there were many analysts in 2002 and beyond who doubted that it would be
able to survive competition from Blockbuster and Wal-Mart.77
Compounding the uncertainty that companies like NetFlix face is the danger that second
and subsequent movers may free-ride on the marketing and other promotion efforts of first
movers. Even if NetFlix was sure that consumers could be persuaded that it makes sense to rent

76

See

Xenia

P.

Kobylarz,

Netflix

Screen

Patent

Controvery

(available

at
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DVDs by mail, such persuasion might be expensive. Once NetFlix persuades consumers that the
business concept is worthwhile, some of those consumers may so closely associate NetFlix with
the concept that they will not seriously consider competitors.

78

Others, however, may research

competitors and choose lower-cost options. In our framework, the need to engage in marketing
may make the entry cost for a first mover higher, thereby increasing the wedge between private
and social benefit. A similar analysis applies to a case in which a first entrant will need to spend
money on lobbying. One obstacle to supersonic travel, for example, is federal regulation of
aircraft noise.79 Even if a particular company thinks that it can persuade Congress to change the
rules, subsequent entrants may be able to free ride on that benefit. We recognize, of course, that
advertising and lobbying sometimes may be inefficient,80 but there are at least some
circumstances in which these activities can provide information that ultimately raises social
welfare,81 and intellectual property protection can increase the likelihood of such activities.
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See, e.g., Harry S. Gerla, A Micro-Microeconomic Approach to Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, 86 MICH. L. REV. 892,

922–923 (1988) (noting that consumers may not choose the lower price option for any number of reasons, such as acting on
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States. 14 C.F.R. § 91.817 (2007); 14 C.F.R. Pt. 91, App. B. (2007).
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See, e.g., Avinash Dixit & Victor Norman, Advertising and Welfare: Another Reply, 11 BELL J. ECON. 753 (1980) (arguing

that competitors may advertise without conveying significant information). One argument against the efficiency of advertising is
that monopolists may use it to protect their market positions. See Jeffry M. Netter, Excessive Advertising: An Empirical Analysis,
30 J. INDUS. ECON. 361, 361 (1982) (citing sources). Our argument indicates that such advertising could be efficient in some
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See, e.g., Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970) (defending advertising as
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2. New product features
In a similar way, the introduction of new product features can be hampered by the fear of
immediate imitation. A producer faces many of the same uncertainties about the demand, supply
and competition when considering the introduction or development of a particular product
feature. If the WordPerfect word processing program included a new feature that proved to be
popular among users—say, a search feature allowing the user to search for portions of a
document containing a number of words not necessarily in order, as on search engines like
Google—then Microsoft might well incorporate that feature as well in its competing Word
program. One would not expect this to stop innovation altogether, in part because introduction
of a new feature gives the innovator a lead-time advantage.

A software company with a

successful new feature may be able to gain market share while others take time to catch up.
Nonetheless, lagging companies may be wary of introducing new features that it expects the
market leader to be able to quickly incorporate, and the leader will be able to innovate only to
induce its customers to buy new versions of the same program.
The inability of an entrepreneur to secure the full benefits of a market experiment with
new product features can help explain why some seemingly obvious product features take so
long to emerge. A possible example is luggage with wheels, a feature that came into common
use only in the late twentieth century. The idea that adding wheels to luggage might be useful is
old in the art. Consider Figure 8, an illustration from a 1914 patent application for a device that
secured wheels to a suitcase.82 Even such a patent would give little market exclusivity, given the
myriad other ways one might attach a wheel to a suitcase. (Wheels, too, are very old in the art.)
If a market experiment with wheels proved successful, established luggage companies would
82

U.S. Patent No. 1,099,933 (issued June 16, 1914).
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surely copy the innovation. This was, of course, precisely what happened once successful
marketing of a suitcase with wheels finally occurred.83 While we cannot eliminate the possibility
that other factors, such as technological complications, may have contributed to the delayed
widespread introduction of luggage wheels, the inadequacy of incentives to engage in market
experiments seems likely to have played some role.

Figure 8. An illustration from a 1914 patent

The inability to prevent second and subsequent movers from free riding on advertising
can be a problem in the product-feature context as well. Consider, for example, a national fastfood chain deciding in the 1990s whether to eliminate “trans fats” from its menu. There had long
been scientific evidence that “trans fats” were harmful, but consumer awareness of the scientific

83
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research was low.84 Perhaps with sufficient advertising, a fast food chain could have convinced
consumers of the dangers of trans fats and persuaded them to give trans-fat-free french fries a
try, but even then, the experiment might have been a failure. Many health innovations, such as
McDonald’s McLean Deluxe, do not catch on among consumers.85 Not only might the chain fail
to draw in new customers, it might also lose customers who decide that they do not like the taste
of the new offerings. Of course, if the experiment were successful, other fast-food chains would
quickly copy the experiment, so the first-mover advantages might be weak. This theory may
help explain why it took food manufacturers so long to begin introducing products with
negligible amounts of trans fats. Similarly, it may also explain why automobile manufacturers
had no interest in trying to sell cars with airbags to consumers. While the common answer to
problems such as this is for the government to undertake educational campaigns to inform the
public86 or to regulate the industry, our analysis suggests that intellectual property protection
might be a useful alternative. Of course, we do not contend that intellectual property rights

84
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guidelines).
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should be available whenever there is a danger that third parties will free ride off the marketing
of others. The challenge is to define the rights in a manner that encourages beneficial marketing
without unduly extending monopoly.
3. New supply-side approaches
The success of a business depends not only on the product being offered to customers,
but also on the efficiency of the supplier’s business organization.

Management literature

concerns itself not with what products consumers want, but with how to structure and operate the
companies that will bring the products to them.87 Just as our modern economy has produced
many innovative products and features, so too may it appear that it produces a plethora of
approaches to business organizations, yet once again that does not establish a priori that we have
the optimal amount of innovation in structuring and organizing business. Indeed, because it may
be particularly difficult to use conventional forms of intellectual property—such as patents or
trademarks—to protect organizational innovations, we should theoretically expect that incentives
to produce novel business organizations may be particularly suboptimal. We may loosely divide
potential organizational innovations into two types: innovations in the processes by which a
particular good or service is supplied, and innovations in the organizational form.
Early nineteenth-century Canada provides an illustration of the former.88 The upstart
North West Company of Montreal challenged the established Hudson Bay Company. While the
Hudson Bay Company essentially waited for animal furs and other goods to be brought to them
87

A popular book that reflects this literature is ROBERT SLATER, JACK WELCH & THE G.E. WAY: MANAGEMENT INSIGHTS AND

LEADERSHIP SECRETS OF THE LEGENDARY CEO (1998).
88

For a description of this competition, see JOHN ROBERTS, THE MODERN FIRM: ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN FOR PERFORMANCE

AND GROWTH

4–12 (2004).
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for exchange, the North West Company established trading posts throughout Canada to
maximize its ability to find valuable goods. Within a few years, the North West Company took
80% of the incumbent’s market share, but the Hudson Bay Company, which enjoyed a more
convenient port, copied North West’s unprotected innovation and was able to win the market
back.89 In the absence of intellectual property protection, firms that make improvements in the
supply chain can expect competitors to copy these improvements, decreasing the attractiveness
of experimentation. The innovation might well have occurred earlier if intellectual property
protection were possible.
Historically, improvements in the organizational form have improved decisionmaking
and thus the productivity of American business. Alfred Chandler has explained how the “visible
hand” of hierarchical management gradually arose in the early twentieth century to displace the
invisible hand of the market.90 More recently, boards of directors employing collegial,
consensus-based decisionmaking have come to play the central role in making most important
strategic decisions for corporations.91 It is possible, of course, that the slow work of evolution has
produced the optimal decisionmaking form, but the relative homogeneity of corporate structures
today could also be a result of lack of robust incentives for innovation.92 Management scholars
have predicted that low communication costs attributable to the Internet will promote the

89
90
91

Id. at ___.
See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002)

(explaining advantages of board in corporate governance).
92

Innovation in corporate law also may occur too slowly. See Michael Abramowicz, Speeding up the Crawl to the Top, 20

YALE J. ON REG. 139 (2003) (assessing possibility that corporate law innovations might be patentable).
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decentralization

of

corporate

decisionmaking,93

and

others

have

suggested

that

“crowdsourcing”94 and “social production”95 may radically alter the conventional model of the
firm. Some form of exclusive rights might accelerate these developments, or at least lead to
earlier identification of the contexts, if any, in which this approach is successful.
In the absence of exclusive rights for market experimentation, supply-side innovation will
still occur. The use of trade secrets is often an effective method to protect supply operations
because of the lower visibility as compared to new products or features.96 Alternatively, third
parties, such as management consultants or supply chain and ERP software manufacturers97 have
93

THOMAS W. MALONE, THE FUTURE OF WORK: HOW THE NEW ORDER OF BUSINESS WILL SHAPE YOUR ORGANIZATION,

YOUR

MANAGEMENT STYLE AND YOUR LIFE (2004). For an assessment of how increased reliance on prediction markets could transform
corporate governance, see generally Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate
Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (2007).
94

See Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, June 2006, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html (coining term

“crowdsourcing” to describe use of amateurs to complete needed work).
95

See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH

OF

NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS

AND

FREEDOM

(2006) (arguing that the networked information economy may lead to more collaborative economic projects). Benkler generally
describes projects in which the participants are not compensated financially, but social production could also take place with
compensation schemes.
96

For example, the supply chain operations of Western companies in China are shrouded in intense secrecy. See James Fallows,

China Makes, The World Takes, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July/August 2007 (“In decades of reporting on military matters, I have
rarely encountered people as concerned about keeping secrets as the buyers and suppliers who meet in Shenzhen and similar
cities.”); see also id. (“Asking a Western company to specify its Chinese suppliers is like asking a reporter to hand over a list of
his best sources.”). As one person who specializes in Chinese supply chains put it, “Supply chain is intellectual property.” Id.
(quoting Liam Casey). “It is not easy to find the right factory, work out the right manufacturing system, ensure the right supply
of parts and raw material, impose the right quality standards, and develop the right relationship of trust and reliability. Companies
that have solved these problems don’t want to tell their competitors how they did so.” Id.
97

Who may, in turn, be deterred from innovation by competition from other software providers. See supra Part I.A.2.
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incentives to improve the operation of existing businesses. Despite these sources of innovation,
our model would still predict underinvestment in innovation if the new supply-side feature can
not be protected by trade secrecy or is relatively easy to implement without the assistance of
experienced consultants.98
4. New geographical markets
The same logic applies to introduction of a new product, new product feature, or new
supply-side approach into a new geographical market. We will see below how exclusive rights
have historically promoted international technology transfer,99 but the principle theoretically can
also apply to technologically hum-drum products and on a local level. Consider, for example, a
decision whether to open the first Ethiopian restaurant in a small city called Podunk. There may
be some questions about whether Podunkians are ready for Ethiopian food, but if they turn out to
like it, there might be enough market share for more than one restaurant. Once again, then, a
potential trailblazing entrepreneur faces the entire downside of an initial investment but must
share some of the upside with future entrants. Perhaps a cunning restaurateur will be able to
expand the restaurant or quickly open a second if the concept is successful, but for some types of
restaurants, the optimal economy of scale is a single restaurant, so that the chef can keep careful
watch over the kitchen. Even where the initial entrepreneur is incapable of expansion, an
intellectual property right could encourage innovation, because the owner of a successful new
restaurant concept could collect royalties from a subsequent entrant.
98

Even in the presence of additional protection as advocated in this paper, one would still expect underinvestment in innovation

because of the generally conservative approach by businesses to their structural features due to issues with entrenched interests
and other agency and risk aversion issues.
99

See infra notes 104–106 and accompanying text.
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We doubt that the restaurant example provides the strongest example of the claim that
incentives to experiment are suboptimal, in part because in some cases it may not be plausible
that a geographical area could possibly support more than one restaurant featuring a certain
ethnic cuisine. In addition, the experience of Ethiopian restaurants in other cities and the
experience of other ethnic restaurants in Podunk may make the demand for Ethiopian cuisine in
Podunk relatively certain ex ante. On the other hand, this point cuts both ways. Podunk’s
potential entrepreneur does not take into account that the experiment in Podunk may provide
information that will help entrepreneurs in other similar cities decide whether to open Ethiopian
restaurants. It may be that no one will open a restaurant in any of several similar cities until
there is evidence of success in at least one.

In addition, there may still be considerable

uncertainty not only about whether those opening the restaurant can execute the concept well
enough for it to be successful,100 but also about what specific innovations may be needed to make
Ethiopian food palatable to Podunkians.
The desirability of public protection of entry into new geographic markets can be seen in
franchising.

Franchise agreements routinely include grants of geographical exclusivity to

encourage entrepreneurs to experiment with entering, and investing in, new and uncertain
markets.101 The franchisor recognizes that a franchisee will be more willing to risk entry into the

100

We accept that much of the uncertainty associated with new restaurants is associated with uncertainty about the quality of the

management and the chef, but the restaurant business is not as unpredictable as commonly believed. See, e.g., Kerry Miller, The
Restaurant-Failure Myth, BUS. WK., Apr. 16, 2007, at 1; H. G. Parsa et al. Why Restaurants Fail, 46 CORNELL HOTEL & REST.
ADMIN. Q. 304 (2005) (concluding that restaurant failure rate within the first year is about 26%, not the reported 90%, and
restaurant failure after three years never exceeds 60%).
101

Pierre Azoulay and Scott Shane observe that territorial exclusivity provisions are common in franchising agreements and that

they lead to a lower failure rate for new franchising systems. See Pierre Azoulay & Scott Shane, Entrepreneurs, Contracts, and
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market, and also to invest more in entering, if, in cases of wild success, that first franchisee will
be legally insulated to some extent from copy-cat competition.
IV. INTEGRATING MARKET EXPERIMENTATION INTO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORY
Our analysis in Part III shows that intellectual property rights for market innovations can
increase social welfare by counterbalancing first-mover disadvantages and thus encouraging
market experimentation.

Yet intellectual property doctrine and theory appear to pay little

explicit attention to this concern. Market experimentation is not recognized as being a type of
benefit that might justify the “embarrassment” of exclusive rights, even though intellectual
property rhetoric tolerates such grants in other circumstances where there is some offsetting
benefit, such as reduced consumer search costs or scientific innovation.102

the Failure of Young Firms, 47 MGMT. SCI. 337 (2001). Azoulay and Shane conclude that the failure to adopt such exclusive
arrangements among some new franchisors is best explained by “their limited knowledge of contracting [which] leads them to
overlook the importance of the franchisor encroachment problem when designing their contracts.” Id. at 356; see also Arthur H.
Travers, Jr., and Thomas D. Wright, Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REV. 795,
795 (1961) (“The three broad types of contractual arrangement by which manufacturers have traditionally sought to channel the
activity of their distributing outlets are the exclusive franchise, the territorial restriction, and the customer restriction.”).
102

Although Thomas Jefferson famously biased the issue by referring to “the embarrassment of an exclusive patent.” 13 THE

WRITINGS

OF

THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (H.A. Washington ed., 1861), commentators frequently recognized that intellectual

property protections can be justified if the benefits exceed the costs. See, e.g., J. A. K. Huntley & Frank H. Stephen, Unfair
Competition, Consumer Deception, and Brand Copying: An Economic Perspective, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 443, 451 (1995)
(finding trademark protection justified so “long as such expenditure is less than alternative consumer search-and-testing costs”);
Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug Pricing: In Search of a Policy, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 691, 699–700 (1993) (arguing that patents are
necessary for encouraging research and development).
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Exclusive rights to protect market experimentation are, however, not without precedent.
In industrializing Britain103 and other countries,104 “patents of importation” gave exclusive rights
to a party that first imported and commercialized products and processes from another country.
Indeed, the patentee need not have had any claim to have been an independent creator of the
technology. Many commentators have viewed patents of importation as being a misguided
mercantilist policy because, unlike modern patents, those exclusive grants did not necessarily
produce new technological information.105 Yet that assessment overlooks that the goals of these
patents was to encourage, not technological experimentation.106 While patents of importation
103

The early British patent system began with the granting of letters patent by King Edward III to foreigners who wished to go

to England to teach the English their respective trades. In the sixteenth century, the crown began to offer letters patent to English
citizens for manufacturing monopolies in England. Though the Crown’s power to grant of letters patent was substantially
circumscribed in 1623 by the Statute of Monopolies,, 1623, 21 Jam., ch. 3 (Eng.), that statute continued to allow patents on any
novelty process or manufacture, and a process or other technology was considered “novel” if it was new to the country. See
generally Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255
(2001) (providing historical discussion of British patent practice).
104
105

EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE 314 (2002).
See, e.g., WALTERSCHEID, supra note 104, at 374–75 (arguing that discovery or invention that is non-novel—as patent of

importation must inherently be—fails to “promote the progress of useful arts”); Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism,
and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1338 (2005) (arguing that both patents of importation and exclusive trading
charters were facets of mercantilist policy that are not consistent with modern U.S. legal norms); Margo A. Bagley, Patently
Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 685–86, 696 (2003)
(arguing that patent system is constitutionally obligated “to avoid granting of patents on ‘old’ information and that patents of
importation and even geographic restrictions on the prior art considered in evaluating a patent are unconstitutional); see also
Margo A. Bagley, Still Patently Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professor Nard, 88 MINN. L. REV. 239, 241–42 (2003).
106

See id. at 314 (explaining that professed goal of patents of importation was minimization of risk involved in importation of

European manufacturing technology to nascent United States). Alexander Hamilton similarly argued that “to the extent that
importation benefits society to the same degree that invention does, it ought to be rewarded by exclusive rights in a similar
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were abandoned in the nineteenth century, the survival of the system through more than a
century provides a clear historical precedent for using exclusive rights to foster market
experimentation.
Nonetheless, the goal of generating market experimentation can help justify various
modern intellectual property doctrines. Perhaps as importantly, market experimentation can help
unify seemingly discordant doctrines across many areas of intellectual property law, providing a
justification relevant not only for copyright and patent protection but also for trademark and
trade secret protection.

These areas have fallen under the same umbrella of “intellectual

property” solely because of the intangible nature of the property right, despite differences in
underlying theoretical justifications. The goal of market experimentation is relevant to each area
of intellectual property and, consequently, might help to bridge the gaps between them to form a
more consistent theory of intellectual property protection across the doctrines.
In this Part, we aim to explain how these existing intellectual property regimes may
reinforce the goals of market experimentation and how that goal explains certain seemingly
peculiar features of the law. Several caveats are in order. First, we do not claim that the goal of
market experimentation is the only, or even the dominant, goal in each area of intellectual
property. We merely contend that each of the regimes advances this purpose to some extent.
Second, although the aim of market experimentation can help explain some intellectual property
doctrines and trends, we do not claim to be offering a comprehensive positive theory of

manner.” Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855,
865 (1998). Nonetheless, early American patent statutes were not seen, even by Hamilton, as authorizing patents of importation.
Id. at 864. Indeed, the legislative history of early congressional debates reveals that a provision that would have authorized
patents of importation was deleted. Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the Patent Act of 1790,
25 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 501–02 & n.206 (1997) (noting that the United States was first country not to allow patents of importation).
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intellectual property law.

Indeed, we suspect that there are many doctrines that seem

inconsistent with the idea of encouraging market experimentation,107 and an aspiration of our
analysis is to urge that some such doctrines be reconsidered. Third, we do not even claim to be
offering a comprehensive defense of doctrines that do advance the goal of market
experimentation.

For example, we will argue that although business method patents may

encourage efficiency by promoting market experimentation, patent doctrine generally is not well
tailored to encourage market experimentation, and under existing patentability standards,
business method patents could well do more harm than good.
We will proceed from areas in which the importance of experimentation is less obvious to
those in which it might be more obvious, highlighting the relevance of market experimentation to
areas of intellectual property law in which it might at first appear to be entirely irrelevant.
Trademark and trade secret have generally been seen as areas of intellectual property law with
their own unique goals,108 but the market experimentation justification connects them both to
each other and to patent and copyright law. In these latter areas, the goal of encouraging
experimentation (though not market experimentation) is perhaps more obvious, so our analysis
will be less revolutionary. But our analysis is most important in these areas, particularly in

107

For example, United States patent law has long eschewed any requirement that the patentee engage in any efforts to

commercial or otherwise to “work” the patented technology. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co, 210 U.S.
405, 429 (1908) (noting that since 1836, Congress has chosen not to impose any working requirement in U.S. patent law and
holding that patentees may “use or not use” their inventions without losing their rights to enforce their patents). That aspect of
patent law cannot be justified by the goal of encouraging market experimentation.
108

See, e.g., Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1695 (1999) (“The

justifications for trademark law are different from those for other forms of intellectual property”).
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patent law, which has the greatest potential to serve as a regime that—at least in theory—could
self consciously promote goals of market experimentation.
A. Trademark
Trademark theory has generally been understood as a doctrine that economizes on
consumer search costs.109 While recognizing the centrality of consumer search to trademark law,
we also believe that trademark law helps foster market experimentation. Trademarks (along with
service marks and trade dress) are central to allowing an entrant into a new market to maintain
market share in the face of competition. If, for example, any competitor were permitted to use
the label “NetFlix” to describe services similar to NetFlix’s, then NetFlix likely would lose
market share much more rapidly and completely once competitors saw the company’s initial
success,110 because the NetFlix product would seem less distinctive and attractive. The goal of
encouraging market experiments like NetFlix, however, provides an additional justification for
trademark protection.

109

Once consumers associate a particular trademark with a particular source, preventing competitors from using that trademark

allows consumers to purchase goods or services associated with the mark without having to engage in further investigation to
confirm quality of the source. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 167–68 (2003). See also Lemley, supra note 117, at 1690 (noting that trademarks “communicate valuable
information to consumers, and thereby reduce consumer search costs”)
110

This effect would occur even if the law allowed the “true” or “original” Netflix to identify itself uniquely in some way so

that consumers could distinguish, with minimal effort, the original from the copyist NetFlixes. For example, trademark law
might be limited only to protecting the use of the word “original,” a word that has occasionally led to legal disputes. See, e.g.,
John Tierney, In a Pizza War, It’s 3 Against The Rest, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1991 at A1. (discussing dispute among many
“original” Ray’s Pizza restaurants).
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Our approach serves as an extension to a related, though less prominent, justification in
trademark theory: Trademark helps protect producers’ investments. Producers can safely make
additional investments in existing goods or services, perhaps using advertising to inform
consumers of the benefits of product improvements, without worrying that consumers will be
unable to identify the improved product.111 Similarly, producers can extend trademarks to related
product areas, allowing consumers to draw quality inferences even about products that they have
never consumed or heard about before.112
A traditional criticism of this justification is that it may create deadweight costs by
inducing over-investment in advertising and marketing to create a “spurious image of high
quality” and, consequently, allowing trademark owners to charge higher prices over generic
products.113 In their classic analysis of the economics of trademark law, William Landes and
Richard Posner note that prices for brand-named goods have “seemed to some economists and
more lawyers an example of the power of brand advertising to bamboozle the public and thereby
promote monopoly.”114 Landes and Posner point out that the presence of differentiated prices
between brand and generic products may not imply deadweight costs if the basis for the
difference is that consumers are paying extra for guarantees of high quality manufacturing or to
avoid the expense of determining whether alternatives are in fact of equal quality.
111
112

115

The

William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269–270 (1987).
See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 823 (1926) (introducing this

theory).
113
114
115

Id. at 274.
Id.
See id. at 275 (arguing that “[t]he fact that two goods have the same chemical formula does not make them of equal quality

to even the most coolly rational consumer.”). Landes and Posner also note that the concerns have not actually influenced
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absence of empirical evidence showing that generic drugs have dramatically inferior quality as
compared to brand drugs,116 however, makes Landes and Posner’s empirical claim difficult to
verify.
Our justification provides a more satisfactory response to the argument that there are
deadweight costs associated with trademark protection. Unlike the classic justification, our
justification does not depend on empirical evidence as to differences in quality between generic
and brand products. Suppose that it could be shown that the application of trademark law in
some identifiable set of cases reduced short-term consumer welfare because consumers
irrationally overestimated the quality benefits of purchasing from the most familiar brand.
Landes and Posner would then need to recommend relaxation of trademark rules, unless some
second-order consideration (such as litigation costs) was sufficient to save the doctrine.117 In
contrast, we argue that trademark serves a useful function even if many consumers, acting solely
in their own private interests, are irrationally brand loyal. If there is some static inefficiency to
consumers’ preferences for brand names, market entrants will expect a greater market share and,
therefore, engage in more market experimentation.118 This point is familiar to the literature on
trademark, as opposed to antitrust, doctrine. Id. at 274–75.
116

The Food and Drug Administration requires that, to be approved for use, a generic drug meet standards to show the generic is

equivalent to a brand-name drug that has already gone through the regulatory process. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006).
117

Landes and Posner suggest that trademark law is appropriate because consumers are willing to pay more for the trademarked

brand because the consumer is saved the cost of searching, and because legal protection is needed to prevent free-riding. Landes
and Posner do not discuss the possibility that consumers irrationally overestimate the value of trademarked goods. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 109, at 166–209.
118

Theoretical economic models recognize but may sometimes understate the extent of brand-name preferences. For example,

under one model, the first mover will have greater market share only proportional to the customer base that was established prior
to the second mover’s entry. See Jean Gabszewicz et al., Sequential Entry with Brand Loyalty Caused by Consumer Learning-
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first-mover advantages, but that literature does not explain that this greater market share may
itself be a social benefit by providing a dynamic incentive to engage in market experimentation.
Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman contend, in a similar fashion to our
argument, that trademark law can usefully “leverage” patent protection.119 Brand loyalty among
consumers allows producers to earn supracompetitive rents even after the patent expires,
increasing the benefits of investments in research and development.120 Meanwhile, trademark
law imposes relatively little social welfare cost. To the contrary, producers have an incentive to
increase output and lower prices during the patent period to increase their market share during
the trademark period.121 Furthermore, there need be no deadweight costs in the trademark period,
because those consumers who find the price of the previously patented good too high can opt, at
some small search expense, for competitors’ lower-priced products, such as generic drugs.
Siegelman and Parchomovsky thus question Supreme Court doctrines that seek to prevent
patentees from using trademark on functional characteristics to extend patent protection.122

by-Using, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 397, 400–01 (1992). In many contexts, it is possible that new customers will prefer the established
product even absent evidence of superior quality.
119

Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455

(2002).
120

Parchomovsky and Siegelman argue that allowing trademark protection to extend beyond patent life encourages companies

to create brand loyalty and therefore reduce monopolistic prices. Id. at 1473–74. If products were not trademark protected after
patent life, any company could produce a copy and market the product under the same name. Id. Therefore, without trademark
protection, the first mover would have no incentive to price competitively while the product is patent protected. Id.
121
122

Id. at 1473–81.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a product’s functional features cannot be trademarked to extend protection

after the expiration of a patent. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2001) (finding that prior
patenting provides strong evidence of functionality, which precludes trademark protection); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
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Our argument extends the logic of Siegelman and Parchomovsky beyond research and
development to include garden-variety market experimentation and the commercialization of
products that may not themselves be particularly technologically innovative or may have long
been known to those skilled in the art. Indeed, trademark’s capacity to leverage patent and other
forms of intellectual property protection is a byproduct of its more general capacity to increase
first-mover advantages and thus to generate greater incentives for market experimentation of all
types, including but not limited to technological experimentation.123

As Siegelman and

Parchomovsky argue, this type of trademark protection (unlike the stronger intellectual property
protection discussed later in this paper)124 has only a small risk of causing deadweight loss.125
Our analysis suggests that trademark law, perhaps entirely by accident, already helps to
advance the goal of market experimentation. At least four seemingly odd features of trademark
law are more justifiable in light of our theory. The first is the so-called “initial interest” line of
cases, in which a firm uses a competitor’s trademark to generate “initial interest” in the firm’s
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (noting that the functionity doctrine prevents trademarks “from inhibiting legitimate
competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature”); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844,
863 (1982) (White, J., concurring in result) (“A functional characteristic is an important ingredient in the commercial success of
the product, and, after expiration of a patent, it is no more the property of the originator than the product itself.” (citations
omitted)). We do not necessarily agree with Parchomovsky and Siegelman’s criticism of the functionality doctrine because, if
trademark law were to cover functional aspects of a product, then the trademark might create more significant deadweight loss by
forclosing the possibility that competitors could market equally viable alternative products.
123

Previous commentators have recognized some forms of market experimentation that trademark protection encourages but

have not paid adequate attention to the risks associated with costly market entry. For example, Landes and Posner note that
trademark protection creates incentives to invest in “new words or symbols or . . . design features.” Landes & Posner, supra note
109, at 169.
124
125

See infra Part IV.C (discussing copyright) and Part IV.D(discussing patents)..
See supra text accompanying notes 113 and 118.
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own product.126 Many courts have held such practices to be trademark infringement even in the
absence of any evidence that consumers would do business with the firm under the mistaken
belief that the firm was its competitor.127 Rather, the courts have justified finding trademark
infringement on the theory that the use of a similar trademark or name would allow the firm to
gain “crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal.”128 Such holdings have been roundly
criticized in the literature as unjustifiably departing from the basic theory on which trademark
law is conventionally based.129 Our theory, however, rehabilitates such decisions. Indeed, under
our view, a second-mover’s use of a first-mover’s trademark is socially undesirable precisely
126

“The rationale for [the initial interest] rule is that the defendant should not be allowed even to get his foot in the door by

means of deception. Once in, he may stay and thereby profit from his wrongdoing.” 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK,
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 22:11.50 (4th ed. 2007).
127

See Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Initial interest confusion exists as a

matter of law as to Nissan Computer’s automobile-related use of “nissan.com”‘nissan.com’ because use of the mark for
automobiles captures the attention of consumers interested in Nissan vehicles.”); Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d
964, 972 (10th Cir. 2002) (establishing six-part test to determine if confusion exists between two trademarks); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that district court had not found that “a third party would do
business with Pegasus Petroleum believing it related to Mobil”).
128
129

Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d at 259.
In criticizing the initial interest confusion doctrine, commentators have sometimes noted that an argument of favor of the

doctrine is that it protects businesses’ investments in goodwill. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the
Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 613 (2006) (arguing the use of initial interest confusion as a basis
for trademark infringement in Internet usage cases does not fit with the functional goals of trademark law, but is a way to prevent
infringers from free-riding on others’ goodwill). But commentators have not explained that the reason to protect goodwill is that
such protection might encourage market experimentation, and they have generally found the “goodwill” argument to be wanting.
See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
105, 162 (2005) (calling goodwill argument a “visceral reaction [that] flies in the face of basic free market principles which
allow, and in fact demand, that competitors be able to benefit from value created by others”).
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because the use of the mark does lower consumer search costs and thus increases the risk that a
consumer will not choose the first mover’s product.
Second, courts are generally reluctant to commit “genericide” by concluding that a
trademark has become generic.130 Everyday language suggests that “Q-Tips” and “Rollerblades”
are used as generic terms by many consumers, and yet they persist as trademarks.131 Scholars
have long noted the law’s reluctance to invalidate existing trademarks as generic and have
argued that this aspect of the law cannot be reconciled with trademark’s goal of reducing
consumer search costs.132 We agree with that argument but nonetheless believe that courts
should keep genericide rare, because the first-mover advantages provided by such trademarks
encourage market entry for future potential products. Although any calculus involving stimulus
to innovation and search costs will necessarily be imprecise, our analysis suggests, for example,
that the phrase “Band-Aid” should remain trademarked. We suspect that many consumers
130

See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc, 692 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that “Coke” is not generic); In re America

Online, Inc., 2006 WL 236389 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd.) (Aug. 2005) (deciding that “INSTANT MESSENGER” is not
generic).
131

See, e.g., Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1953) (holding that “Q-Tips” constitutes trademark

subject to protection by law); Deborah R. Gerhardt, The 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act Rolls Out a Luxury Claim and a
Parody Exemption, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 205, 214 (2007) (citing “Rollerblade” as trademark that owner must protect diligently, so
it does not become generic).
132

Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1358-59 (1980) (noting that

“[c]onsumers face enhanced search costs and risks as a result of the claim of exclusive rights to generic words” and arguing that
the “legal tests of genericness … do not adequately take into account relevant economic considerations”); Deven R. Desai &
Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1844 (2007) (arguing that the law of
genericism should focus on “whether the putative mark is serving as a source identifier in the marketplace” and that, if it is not,
then it should be viewed as generic and unprotectable); see also Lemley, supra note 117, at 1696 n.40 (observing that “[c]reating
circumlocutions to avoid [generic] trademarks is costly”).
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purchase this brand of adhesive bandages simply because it is the only one that uses the phrase
“Band-Aid.”133 Price-conscious consumers, however, can still choose other brands, so we doubt
this preference produces significant efficiency losses. Meanwhile, the profits that Johnson &
Johnson continues to earn as a result of this consumer preference will encourage other innovation
in the future.
Third, courts have been increasingly been willing to extend trademark protections to
trade dress and product configurations, and commentators have also criticized this trend as
extending trademark protections beyond the level needed to advance the traditional interest in
permitting consumers to identify the source of goods.134 Once again, we agree with other
commentators that trademark law may well be exceeding its traditional justifications in this area,
but we believe the change is salutary. The expanded law of trade dress protection allows a firm
engaging in a market experiment to dress the innovative product in a design that is “inherently
distinctive” (so that it will be assured of legal protection135) and that is sufficiently memorable

133

See also Folsom & Teply, supra note 132, at 1340-46 (noting that many consumers may use trademarked words such as

Plexiglass, Thermos, and Teflon when they actually want any product from the generic category and that competitors to the
trademarked good may have a difficult time competing because they need first to educate consumers that the generic is the same
as the trademarked).
134

See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 108, at 1700-01 (noting the expansion of the law in this respect and arguing that, under recent

court decisions, “the link between product configuration and consumer source identification has all but disappeared”); see also
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 387 (1999) (asserting that the trade dress cases, coupled with
other recent developments, “have created an environment that welcomes claims based on little more than a defendant’s imitation
of a successful product”).
135

See Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana Restaurant, 505 U.S. 763, 770 (1992) (holding that “inherently distinctive” trade dress is

subject to protection under the Lanham Act without any proof that the trade dress has acquired “secondary meaning” – i.e.,
without proof that consumer uniquely associate the dress with a specific source).
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for the consumer to associate the product with the design. If the market experimentation is
successful, second-movers will face a barrier to entering the market because they will have to
convince consumers that a product with quite different appearance is functionally the same as the
known product. Trade dress protection can thus give the first-mover some reward for the risk of
the market experiment while also creating an incentive to curtail deadweight losses: The firstmover will realize that if it tries to charge to much for the successful product, consumers may
educate themselves about competing products.
Finally, our theory makes the cause of action of trademark dilution136 seem less alien to
trademark law. The most common dilution concern is that use of a famous mark by a junior
user137 for unrelated products -- say, footballs branded as Harley-Davidson (or even just
Harley138) -- may “blur” the famous mark, diminishing its branding power. The dilution action
has been controversial,139 perhaps largely because the concerns of dilution seem largely
136

The dilution cause of action explicitly protects branding, barring actions that may dilute a trademark even in the absence of

any evidence that such dilution will cause consumer confusion. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98,
109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)). See also Julie Manning Magid et al., Quantifying Brand Image:
Empirical Evidence of Trademark Dilution, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 5-6 (2006) (noting that the “notion of protecting the inherent
value of the trademark from dilution was singularly antithetical to the consumer confusion emphasis of trademark law).
137

A junior user is one who enters the market after the trademark holder. It is consistent with our theory that dilution law does

not apply to senior users, who entered the market before the user whose use made the mark famous.
138

Ronda Ag v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 3597 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 27, 1997) (unpublished order affirming the

Patent & Trademark Office’s cancellation of the mark “Harley” for watches even though the appellant Ronda had been using the
mark on its watches for several years).

139

See, e.g., Kathleen B. McCabe, Dilution-by-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68

FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1830 (2000) (discussing judicial skepticism toward dilution cause of action); Lemley, supra note 117, at
1698 and 1714 (using dilution doctrine as “the most obvious example of doctrinal creep in trademark law” and calling on courts
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independent of the traditional goals of trademark of minimizing consumer search costs.140 The
action, however, makes more sense from a market experimentation perspective. By protecting
brand value built from market innovation, our theory provides a more solid justification for
dilution protection.

First, the higher anticipated value that dilution protection confers on

successful brands increases the incentives to engage in market experiments.141 If a manufacturer
can figure out a combination of features that consumers greatly desire, it is rewarded with the
additional protection conferred by trademark law. Moreover, the mark holder may have an
incentive to maintain a high reputation and reasonable prices. If consumers are not well satisfied
with the trademark owner’s products or believe that the goods are overpriced, they may lose the
positive assessment of the trademark owner necessary to generate sales of the relevant licensed
goods. Second, the dilution cause of action preserves the mark holder’s ability to use the mark
on entirely new goods and services, increasing anticipated market share and thus the
attractiveness of market entry. For example, Harley-Davidson could lend its name to a novel
approach for a vacation resort (perhaps one that caters to the tastes of Harley motorcycle
owners), with the trade name making it slightly harder for second-movers to free-rider in the
event of success. These arguments suggest that courts should perhaps not be too stingy in
“to impose significant limitations” on the marks eligible for dilution protection).
140

Id. at 1698 (noting that “because consumers do not have to be confused for dilution to occur, dilution law represent a

fundamental shift in the nature of trademark protection”). For example, no one seems likely to purchase Harley footballs based
on a belief that the brand necessarily identifies the source of the goods, and the existence of such footballs made by an entity
other than the motocycle manufacturer would not seem to make it more difficult for Harley to convey to the public any
improvement in its motorcycles.
141

Cf. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 495 (“Others who see the watches bearing the Rolex trademarks

on so many wrists might find themselves discouraged from acquiring a genuine [Rolex] because the items have become too
common place and no longer possess the prestige once associated with them.”).

65

MARKET EXPERIMENTATION
determining that a mark is sufficiently famous to qualify for the dilution cause of action,142
although we recognize that the limited number of attractive potential marks means that courts
should not prevent use of a relatively unknown mark for unrelated products.
B. Trade Secret
One of the common justifications for trade secret law is that it serves a purpose similar to
the patent system: Protection of secrets encourages firms to invest in the production of valuable
secrets and thus in technical and scientific advances.143 Yet this theory has some important
difficulties. First, one of the main policies of the patent system is to ensure that non-obvious
technical information is made public and is not kept as a trade secret.144 A firm can pay a heavy
price for maintaining non-obvious technological information as a trade secret including the
possibility that another firm may patent that information and enjoin the original creator’s use.145
Second, it seems puzzling that the law should seek to protect technical advances that are so
minimal that they would not qualify for patent protection, presumably because they are obvious.
A partial answer to this puzzle is that trade secret protection avoids the transaction costs
142

See, e.g., Monica Hof Wallace, Using the Past to Predict the Future: Refocusing the Analysis of a Federal Dilution Claim,

73 U. CIN. L. REV. 945, 959–69 (2005) (discussing requirements for showing that mark is “famous”).
143

See Jonathan R. Chally, The Law of Trade Secrets: Toward a More Efficient Approach, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1269, 1280 (2004)

(“Trade secret law enhances exclusivity and thereby increases innovation by supplanting the precautions that an innovator must
take to guard the secrecy of her information.”).
144
145

Landes & Posner, supra note 109, at 294; see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 64, at 41–42.
Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J.). Other risks include the possibility that the

secret may leak or that the inventor will forfeit his right to a patent if he does not apply within year after the invention was “in
public use or on sale.” Id.; see also Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944) (stating that
patents provide monopoly as reward for inventions, but that “the quid pro quo is disclosure . . . .”).
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associated with attempts to secure patents,146 but this answer purports to reduce trade secret to a
kind of second-class intellectual property protection for relatively unimportant innovations.
Another justification for trade secret law is that the law is trying to minimize what
otherwise would be significant social costs associated with self-help remedies.147

This

justification may be correct, but it depends upon the answer to an empirical question—would the
social costs associated with self-help be greater than the social costs associated with trade secret
law, such as litigation?148

Moreover, the law could limit self-help costs by affirmatively

requiring information disclosure, for example through a hypothetical Freedom of Information
Act that applied to the private sector. As long as third parties were required to pay for the
transactions costs associated with information requests,149 third parties would seek information
only when the benefits to them were greater than the production costs. Reducing self-help may

146

Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret

Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 139 (1999) (“Because trade secret law provides cost-efficient, dependable legal rights, it reduces
the inventor’s incentive to pursue the patent alternative.”).
147

See Micheal Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets? 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 27 (2007) (“[I]f information can be

kept secret through self-help, then owners will spend more money to keep the information secret even in the absence of the
law.”).
148

Courts do insist, as a prerequisite to trade secret protection, that the owners of a trade secret make some effort to keep it

secret. See, e.g., United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 2002) (determining, in criminal appeal for conviction of
dealing in trade secrets, whether owner of trade secret took reasonable measures to keep information secret); see also 18 U.S.C. §
1839(3)(A) (providing that, in order to have trade secret, owner must have “taken reasonable measures to keep such information
secret”). But they do not seek to determine whether self-help would be more efficient than trade secret protection in individual
cases.
149

Such payments are required under the Freedom of Information Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (2006).
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be a partial justification for trade secret doctrine, but it seems empirically questionable and
incomplete.
A clue to improving our understanding of trade secret law lies in the recognition that it
extends not only to technological information that may be difficult or costly to produce but also
to nontechnological information like customer lists and sales figures.150 This aspect of trade
secret law is difficult to explain using the two justifications for trade secret law given above.
The incentive-to-produce theory cannot justify protection for nontechnological data because that
sort of information would be produced in the ordinary course of business even if intellectual
property law did not provide any special incentive to produce it. Meanwhile, given the existence
of disclosure requirements for organizations such as public corporations,151 affirmative disclosure
regimes might appear to be viable alternatives to trade secrets for accounting information in
particular.
Justifying trade secret law as an appropriate social subsidy to encourage market
experimentation makes for a more solid foundation. This view accounts for why trade secret law
protects information such as customer lists and other data that would be naturally produced
during the ordinary course of business. The goal of trade secret law is not to encourage the
production of that information so much as the production of the business. Sometimes, of course,
a business’s success will be difficult to disguise, but even then there might be uncertainty about
whether the business is so successful to justify entry of a competitor. The law protects whatever
business data can be hidden, thus discouraging subsequent entry and increasing a first entrant’s

150

See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roth, 485 F.3d 930 (2007) (holding that customer information was trade secret under

Wisconsin’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
151

See 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)-(aa) (requiring material disclosure of information about securities offered for public sale).
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expected share of rents, creating stronger incentives for the market experiments that produce the
data.152 On our theory, trade secret law may be overinclusive—it protects copycat businesses
too—but, in general, innovators may be the businesses that have the most information worth
protecting.
C. Copyright
A market experimentation theory has also been invoked as part of the explanation for the
existence of copyright. As then Professor Breyer noted in 1970, copyright has historically been
justified in terms of the incentives not only for authors, but for publishers too.153 Indeed,
“[h]istorically the publisher led the fight for laws that allow him to obtain exclusive rights,”154
and in at least some markets, an important part of the publisher’s costs is the investments in
publishing “books of unpredictable future popularity.”155 Without copyright, publishers might be
willing to invest less in books of unpredictable popularity – like “an author’s first novel” –
because “competition will diminish the size of the best seller’s payoff” and thus make
publication a less attractive “gamble.”156 As Landes and Posner recognize, a publisher cannot

152
153

See Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2006)
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84

HARV. L. REV. 281, 292 (1970).
154
155
156

Id.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 312; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 109, at 40-41 (noting that the problem of recouping the costs of writing

and publishing a work is magnified “by the fact that the author’s cost of creating the work, and many publishing costs …, are
incurred before it is known what demand for the work will be” and that the copyist may avoid that risk by waiting “until he
knows whether the work is a success” prior to investing in publication)
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eliminate this risk through building a large and diversified portfolio of works because “even a
diversified publisher will be at risk of losing his upside if his competitors are to copy his
successful works.”157
A market experimentation theory can provide at least a partial explanation for some of
the oddities of copyright law. For example, it is well-known that copyright terms of protection
have grown dramatically longer over the past 200 years. Current terms of protection are nearly
equal to or exceeding a century in length.158 The additional years of protection recently added to
the copyright term159 seem little justified in terms of providing an incentive to the original author
to create the work.160 If such lengthy terms are justified (a matter on which there remains
considerable debate),161 a market experimentation theory provides a better justification than an
incentive-to-create theory. The decision to run an additional printing of an old book or a new
release of an old film, accompanied with a sufficient marketing campaign to inform consumers,
157
158

LANDES & POSNER, supra note 109, at 41.
See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978 . . . endures for a term consisting of the life of

the author and 70 years after the author’s death.”).
159
160

Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302).
Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)

(No. 01-618).
161

For critiques arguing that the copyright term is too long, see generally Avishalom Tor & Dotan Oliar, Incentives to Create

Under a “Lifetime-Plus-Years” Copyright Duration: Lessons From a Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437 (2002) (arguing that although life-plus-years term of Copyright Act provides strong incentives to produce
copyrighted works, extension of years portion of duration does not increase those incentives); see also Marci A. Hamilton,
Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655 (1996) (suggesting that not
enough empirical research has been conducted to base justification for copyright term extensions on incentives to create). For a
defense of the long copyright term, at least for derivative works, see Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative
Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 366 (2005).
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may be a highly risky business venture. It is, in effect, a test of the current market for the book
or film. In the absence of copyright protection, the risk is borne entirely by the first mover. If
the work is not protected by copyright and the market proves favorable, second movers and
consumers would reap a significant portion of the benefits. Yet, if the risk borne by the firstmover is too great and the portion of the benefits realized too little, the market test will never
occur.162 Consumers may be better off permitting the first mover to reap more benefits so that
there are more market tests, and thereby a greater diversity of works, including old works.
As we have stressed, however, the market experimentation theory does not necessarily
lead to more and more expansive theories of intellectual property. Lengthening copyright terms
may be a sensible response where, in the absence of a property right, no one would have an
incentive to republish the work.163 It is much more difficult to justify lengthening copyrights on
wildly popular works, like Mickey Mouse films, because little market uncertainty currently
exists with respect to such works. Long copyright terms are thus a somewhat crude mechanism
for encouraging market experiments on works that have yet failed to attract public attention. In
this case, recognizing the market experimentation concerns would likely lead to a more
circumscribed right to lengthy copyrights.

162

Landes and Posner make a similar point in justifying a system of indefinitely renewable copyrights. See William M. Landes

& Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 488–89 (2003) (considering incentives to
resurrect works of forgotten novelist whose works have fallen into public domain). They do not, however, acknowledge that the
point furnishes a broader argument for intellectual property protection of market experimentation, nor do they note that their
point may apply even to new editions or releases of readily remembered works.
163

See supra notes 158 to 166 and the accompanying text.
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Similarly, in the areas of derivative rights, market experimentation may help to explain
not so much the extent but the allocation of rights. Under current copyright law,164 the creator of
a first work had broad rights to derivative works based on the initial work. The rules of
derivative works involve not so much a broadening of copyrights but reallocation of rights from
the creator of the derivative work in favor of the creator of the original work. Under an incentive
to create theory, broad derivative rights present a conundrum: The broader right granted to the
copyright of the initial work might increase the incentives to create that initial work, but it also
reduces the incentives for others to create the derivative works. The counterbalancing effect
might lead to the creation of fewer works, and the incentive-to-create theory cannot easily justify
the law’s preference for the creator of the initial work over the creator of the derivative work.
Market experimentation does justify the preference. An initial work will almost certainly face
more risk than a derivative work if for no other reason than that creators of derivative works can
avoid making derivatives of flops. No one invests in sequels to Ishtar, Heaven’s Gate, or The
Adventures of Pluto Nash,165 while it is fairly easy to predict that Shrek II & III had better
chances of success than the average movie. The right to the derivative work is thus allocated to
the work that bears the higher level of market risk, and this increases the incentives to bear the
164

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,

musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom
of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 50 (2002) (arguing for different intellectual property regime with
greatly reduced protection for derivative rights).
165

According to Wikipedia, these are three of the least successful films ever: The failure of Heaven’s Gate is credited with

bankrupting the prominent studio United Artists; Ishtar was a “notorious bomb” despite a cast including stars Dustin Hoffman
and Warren Beatty; and Pluto Nash is said to hold the current record as the biggest box office loser, with a net lost of $92
million. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_US_box_office_bombs.
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greater risks in creating truly innovative characters or plots,166 even though it may decrease the
number of derivative works that are produced from works that turn out to be successful.
Finally, market experimentation may suggest that copyrights should be narrowed in some
fields where the costs of distribution, and thus costs of markets experiments, have fallen
dramatically. Internet distribution of music and writings is a standard example where new
technologies have dramatically decreased distribution costs.167 Though we are not convinced
that some degree of copyright protection cannot be justified on the basis of the incentive to create
theory, or that the reduction in distribution costs has eliminated the riskiness of underwriting new
music (perhaps the real cost lies in the advertising campaign that educates potential consumers as
to the value of the work), we nonetheless must agree that reductions in distribution costs reduce
the costs of market experiments and therefore raise the question whether copyright needs
contraction.
Ultimately, however, copyright law is probably the area of intellectual property that least
advances our thesis. The problem is that copyright is simply too narrow to encourage much
experimentation. If someone has an idea for a new type of book that turns out to be successful,
then others can write similar books and compete with the original. The markets for readers,
listeners, and viewers are like any other markets, and there will generally be insufficient
166

See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.3 (2d ed. Supp. 2002) (explaining that there will be greater incentives to promote

novel if no one else will be able to copy its expressive content).
167

See Raymong Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology,

69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 294-296 (2002) (arguing that the recent dramatic decrease in the costs of distributing songs undermines
part of the justification for copyright in the field); Breyer, supra note ___, at 299 (accurately predicting that the advent of
computers lower the costs of initial publishing by, for example, “eliminating the cost of retyping copy on, for example, a linotype
machine” and “lower[ing] inventory costs by making possible the printing of books ‘on demand.,” and arguing that such possible
developments may weaken the case for copyright).
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incentives for writers, musicians, and movie studios to undertake risky experiments whose
primary value would come from encouraging new work from competitors.

Even worse,

someone who undertakes the expensive experiment of compiling a large but unoriginal data set
cannot rely on copyright to protect even the data compiled,168 let alone the idea of attempting to
compile similar sets. Though there may well be sound reasons for these limitations, many
aspects of copyright law thus do not seem finely tuned to encouraging market experimentation.
D. Patents
In the modern era, the standard justification for patents is that they are necessary to
encourage the production of useful technological information.169 This justification accounts for
many of patent law’s major features, including (1) the requirement that the patentee provide a
complete and enabling disclosure of the patented subject matter;170 (2) the prohibition against
patenting non-novel or obvious subject matter, with novelty and nonobviousness defined on the
basis of all or nearly all information that is publicly available anywhere in the world;171 and (3)
the general absence of any requirement that the patentee actually commercialize the patented

168
169

See Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (“First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention . . . .”)

(citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bircon Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974)); see also, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2003) (arguing that modern applications of patent law promote innovation
non-uniformly between different high-technology industries).
170

Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); see also J.E.M. Agric. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 142

(2002) (stating assumption that “[t]he disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude’”)(quoting
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974))..
171

See id. § 102 (novelty); id. § 103 (nonobviousness).
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subject matter.172 Nevertheless, a market experimentation theory provides an explanation for
certain patent practices. We outline four such doctrines below. For the first two, we are
somewhat critical and show how these practices can lead to inefficient results unless other
modifications of patent doctrine are also made. For the second pair, we view the doctrines more
favorably but suggest some modifications.
Two features of modern U.S. patent law—the recognition of business method patents173
and the weakening of the traditional nonobviousness standard174—are quite plainly linked to a
theory of market experimentation. We can make this assertion with confidence because both of
these two developments were pioneered and encouraged by Judge Giles Rich, who expressly
endorsed the view that patent law should be designed to provide “an inducement to risk an
attempt to commercialize the invention.”175 That “‘business’ aspect of the matter,” Rich argued,
“is responsible for the actual delivery of the invention into the hands of the public.” 176 Although
Rich did not consider the possibility of providing exclusive rights where there was no invention

172

See id. § 271(d)(4); see also Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (holding that patent is not

unenforceable merely because patentee neglected to use it).
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174

See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Commerce and Equivalence: Defining the Proper Scope of Internet Patents, 7 MICH.

TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 373–74 (2000-2001) (asserting that, before creation of Federal Circuit, patents were
invalidated on basis of obviousness in two-thirds or more of cases where patent was found invalid, but that proportion dropped to
as low as one-fifth following creation of the Federal Circuit, suggesting that “obviousness is much less central in appellate
determinations of patent validity under the Federal Circuit”). But see KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727
(2007) (rejecting Federal Circuit’s approach to determine whether patent is obvious).
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176

Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws (pt. 2) 159, 177 (1942).
Id.
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of any kind, he believed that the public benefits of commercialization provided a core
justification for the patent system.
Over a half century after then-lawyer Rich wrote those words, business method patents
became recognized by U.S. courts in State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group
Inc.,177 an opinion authored by Judge Rich. In some circumstances, business method patents can
be justified without resort to a theory of encouraging commercialization or market
experimentation. For example, the creation of an innovative technique in business, such as the
Black-Scholes method for pricing options,178 might be viewed as highly similar to the production
of new technological information in a field of engineering, broadly conceived. But this category
of business innovations may not exhaust the class of business methods patents that have been
issued by the U.S. PTO. In 2005, for example, the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office once held that a business method patent need not make any
“technological” contribution to the art.179 Such nontechnological business patents might be

177
178

149 F.3d 1368 (Fed Cir 1998).
See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973).; see

also F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex Mathematics of Patent
Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1176 n.6 (2003) (describing history and utility of Black-Scholes formula).
179

Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 2005). We note that the Board of Patent Appeals and

Interferences has recently changed course on this issue. See _____. The Federal Circuit also seems to be trying to cut back on
State Street and to curtail the availability of business method patents. Our point in the text is merely that, for some period of
time, the U.S. PTO was willing to issue business method patents without necessarily demanding that the patents disclosed
nonobvious technical information (broadly construed). The Federal Circuit’s apparent willingness to cut back on all method
patents – including those that offer nonobvious insights into complex arts such as finance, arbitration and risk management –
raises other issues that are beyond the scope of this Article.
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justified on the grounds that they encourage the development and market testing of
“economically nonobvious” business methods. 180
Another major development of U.S. patent law starting in the late twentieth century was
the weakening of the traditional nonobviousness standard.181 The traditional view of
nonobviousness requires the patent specification to have revealed some significant new
technological information.182 Between 1982 and 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit dramatically weakened this standard of obviousness by requiring proof of a teaching,
suggestion, or motivation in the prior art before any permutation of old technology could be
considered obvious.183 In taking this step, the Federal Circuit was led by Judge Rich.184 Such a
180

By “economically nonobvious” business methods, we mean methods of doing business that can be launched without any new

information but that have uncertain prospects as to whether they could possibly succeed. For example, in 1998, no one would
have needed any additional information to create a business like Netflix; the reason it was not created was because its chances of
market success were so uncertain.
181
182

See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 174, at 370–94 (discussing vitiation of nonobviousness requirement in Federal Circuit).
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11–18 (1966) (holding that Patent Act of 1952 embraces objective doctrine of

Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851) for establishing nonobviousness, requiring that, in comparison with
previous art, patent must evince some innovation beyond foresight of person having ordinary skill in pertinent art).
183

See, e.g., In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 995–96 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Pro-Mold v. Great Lakes Plastics, 75 F.3d 1568,

1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Scholarly commentary roundly criticized this teaching-suggestion-motivation test as too lax on patent
invalidation. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 174, at 379 (offering “suggestion test” as factor in the vitiation of nonobviousness
requirement). The Supreme Court ultimately held that this test of obviousness was too constrained. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007) (“The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words
teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of
issued patents.”)\; see also John F. Duffy, Commentary, KSR v. Teleflex: Predictable Reform of Patent Substance and Procedure
in

the

Judiciary,

106

Mich.

L.

Rev.

First

Impressions

34

(2007),

http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol106/duffy.pdf (discussing the author’s involvement in the KSR litigation
and the effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case).
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watering down of the nonobviousness standard is difficult to justify if the sole goal of patent law
is to encourage the production of new technological information. If, on the other hand, the
patent system is designed to encourage the commercialization of new (but not necessarily
technologically innovative) products, then the weakening of the nonobviousness standard is at
least understandable. Indeed, a logical extension of the theory would permit patents to issue on
products that were technologically non-novel, provided that they did not already exist in the
marketplace.
In recognizing that these first two developments in U.S. patent law could be justified on
the grounds of encouraging market experimentation, we do not mean to suggest that promoting
market experimentation is more important than promoting technological experimentation. Nor
do we believe that business method patents and the watering down of the nonobviousness
standard are necessarily positive developments. To the contrary, we believe these developments
could lead to dramatically inefficient results unless other aspects of patent law are also modified.
Most importantly, current U.S. patent law does not require a patentee to bring the invention to
market,185 does not try evaluate the economic nonobviousness of proposed , and does not
consider the post-patenting commercialization exclusively by individuals other than the patentee
as a reason to invalidate an issued patent.186 In combination, these features of patent law provide
an opportunity for patentees to free ride off the efforts of the true first movers in a field.187
184

See generally George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S.C. § 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, the Obvious Patent Law Hall-of-Famers,

32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 509–58 (1999) (discussing Judge Rich’s deep contributions to evolution and application of
obviousness doctrine in U.S. courts).
185

35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4); See also Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (“[I]t is the privilege of

any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive.”).
186

MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (holding that MercExchange’s lack of commercial activity does
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A good example is provided by the recent “BlackBerry” litigation.188 The patentee in that
case held broad patents on the technological capability of sending e-mail via a wireless network
to a wireless device.189 Technologically, these patents were highly suspect and most likely
obvious.190 It is nonetheless possible to believe that the development and commercialization of a
wireless e-mail product entailed enormous market risks, though those risks were economic and
nontechnological. But if so, those risks were borne by Research in Motion (RIM), the first
mover that developed and commercialized the BlackBerry.191 The patent system produced what
not preclude its right to injunction after finding of willful infringement). Further, the district courts and the Federal Circuit did
not consider the lack of commercial use when considering validity of the patents in question in NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion,
Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (NTP was patent-holding company); MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (MercExchange no longer used patented technology); and Eolas Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (Eolas was not commercializing patented technology).
187

See, e.g., Sean M. O’Conner, Using Stock and Stock Options to Minimize Patent Royalty Payment Risks After Medimmune v.

Genentech, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 381, 384 (2007) (describing the operation of “patent trolls” who do not commercialize their
patents and wait until another party infringes on them).
188

NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1157 (2006); see also Ian

Austen, BlackBerry Service to Continue Service, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2006, at C1 (providing brief history of litigation, which
culminated in settlement award to NTP of $612.5 million).
189

For a description of NTP’s patents-in-suit, which contemplate the receipt of electronic mail to a wireless portable RF

receiver, see NTP, 418 F.3d. at 1288–90. No particular wireless network (beyond the source and receiver) is contemplated in
NTP’s patents, nor do the patents detail a method for sending messages from the receiver. Id. The court compares this to
Research In Motion’s more particularized system, which incorporates server-end software, nationwide mobile wireless networks,
and a method for sending messages from the RF receiver. Id.
190

The PTO decided to reconsider the validity of the patents while the litigation was pending. See Teresa Riordan, The Battle

over Blackberry Heads to a Crucial Court Date, and a Challenge of More Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2003, at C1.
191

See Sofy Carayannopoulos, Research in Motion: A Small Firm Commercializing a New Technology, 29 ENTREPRENEURSHIP

THEORY & PRAC. 219, 219–25 (2005) (providing history of RIM and notes on development, production and marketing of
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is, in our view, a startlingly backwards result: RIM was forced to pay more than a half billion
dollars192 to a patentee who had contributed little or nothing to technological advances and had
risked nothing in the commercialization of the technology.193 Rather than rewarding the first
mover, the patent system imposed an unjustified tax upon the company.194
Two other patent law doctrines show that considerations of market experimentation can
be deployed more subtly to adjust rights. In MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc.,, the Supreme
Court ruled that a district court must use the “traditional [equitable test] that governs the award
of injunctive relief” in determining whether to issue injunctions in patent cases.195

In an

influential concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy stressed that in deciding to withhold injunctive
relief, court should consider whether the patentee is “us[ing] patents not as a basis for producing

BlackBerry system).
192
193

See Austen, supra note 188, at C1.
See Mike Huglett, Blurry on Blackberry, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 2006, at C1 (explaining that Thomas Campana, Jr., inventor of

patents-at-suit, founded NTP merely in order to “work out licensing agreements for [his] patents”).
194

Before the settlement, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office indicated that, upon review, it would likely find several, if not

all, of NTP’s patents to be invalid. See Ian Austen, U.S. Patent Office Likely to Back BlackBerry Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2005, at C5. Indeed, the PTO found two of the nine disputed patents to be invalid before RIM ultimately settled with NTP. See
Bloomberg News, Ruling for Maker of BlackBerry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005, at C4 (reporting nonfinal ruling by USPTO that
one of NTP’s patents was invalid); Ruling May Help BlackBerry Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at C4 (reporting two final
actions by USPTO that found two NTP patents invalid). Yet RIM remained under tremendous practical pressure to settle the
litigation because it faced the strong likelihood that the district court would issue an injunction shutting down RIM’s service prior
to the government’s final resolution of the reexamination proceedings. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Inc., 397 F. Supp.
2d 785, 786–89 (E.D. Va. 2005) (noting that District Court and Federal Circuit had denied four previous attempts by RIM to stay
proceedings during the reexamination of NTP’s patents).
195

126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006)
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and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”196 That view, which lower
courts seem to be following,197 is consistent with a market experimentation theory. On the
margin, the law should favor firms risking market entry over firms that avoid such risk. Those
who invest in bringing a technology to market should be entitled to slightly more generous
remedies if they are patentees, and slightly greater accommodation if they are defendants in
infringement actions. Here a market experimentation theory justifies both a slight expansion and
a slight contraction of baseline rights.
Similarly, U.S. patent law has frequently looked to commercialization efforts in deciding
the scope and validity of patents. Under the so-called “paper patent” doctrine, U.S. courts have
in the past distinguished between patents that remain merely pieces of paper issued by a
government agency and those that are made into commercial products.

In a variety of

circumstances, the paper patent doctrine either extended or limited patent rights depending on the
commercialization. In deciding questions of infringement, court frequently held that a paper
patent was to be given more narrow interpretation than a commmercialized patent.198 Also in
determining a patent’s validity, courts would discount prior art references that were merely paper
patents and thus allow patentees to patent subject matter that was closer to uncommercialized
prior art than would have been permitted if the prior art had been commercialized.199 Finally,
196
197

Id. at 1649.
See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 582-83 (E.D. Va. 2007) (quoting Justice Kennedy’s

concurring opinion in the course of denying MercExchange’s request for an injunction).
198

See, e.g., Wire Tie Mach. Co. v. Pacific Box Corp., 102 F.2d 543, 556 (9th Cir. 1939) (holding a patent on an innovation

never “utilized or placed upon the market” to be “a paper patent” that would not be given “any broader scope than it is clearly
required to be given”).
199

Power Curbers, Inc. v. E. D. Etnyre & Co., 298 F.2d 484, 493 (4th Cir. 1962) (rejecting the argument that a successful patent
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courts would count successful commercialization of an invention in favor of sustaining the
validity of the patent.200

Though the paper patent doctrine has fallen out of favor (perhaps

because it was hard to reconcile with the dominant view that the patent system encourages the
production and disclosure of technical information),201 our analysis suggest that the paper patent
doctrine may have served a useful economic function in encouraging and protecting market
experiments and that a revitalization of the doctrine may be in order.
One aspect of the paper patent doctrine survives in modern validity analysis. While U.S.
patent law has no clear doctrine permitting the nonobvious feature of the invention to be related
solely to commercialization (as opposed to technical achievement),202 it does allow for
should be viewed as an obvious variation of “a number of old paper patents” and reasoning that patents “for useful inventions
ought not be invalidated and held for naught because of such excursions into the boneyard of failures and abandoned
experiments”).
200

See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1944) (counting the patentee’s commercial

success in favor of sustaining the patent where the patentee was the first to market the product and the product “met with
immediate commercial success”); compare Todd v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 216 F.2d 594, 596 (4th Cir. 1954) (invalidating a
patent determined to be “mere paper patent which has never been put into production”); Air Reduction Co. v. Carbo-Oxygen Co.,
17 F.2d 138, 142 (D. Del. 1926) (holding patent invalid based in part on the finding that “the patent is purely a paper patent [that]
has made no imprint upon the art”), aff’d 19 F.2d 1014 (3rd Cir. 1927) (expressing adopting the district judge’s reasoning on the
paper patent issue); Schweyer Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Reading Co., 63 F.2d 402, 405 (3rd Cir. 1933) (viewing a patent on a device
not “successful enough to warrant the risk of installation and use” to be a “theoretical or paper patent” and invalidating it for want
of invention).
201

Frank B. Killian & Co. v. Allied Latex Corp., 188 F.2d 940, 942 (2nd Cir. 1951) (L. Hand, J.) (disparaging the phrase, “paper

patent” as “a mere bit of rhetoric, usually employed as a makeweight by judges who wish to support the patent in suit, but are
embarrassed by a reference, of an escape from which they are not too confident. It is a meaningless platitude.refusing to
invalidate a patent on the basis of its similarity to prior art”).
202

A proposal for awarding patents on the basis of commercial nonobviousness is set forth in Karen I. Boyd, Nonobviousness

and the Biotechnology Industry: A Proposal for a Doctrine of Economic Nonobviousness, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 311, 337–43
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commercial success to be considered as a factor in the nonobviousness analysis.203 Thus, if the
commercializer can make even a relatively modest change to previously known subject matter,
the modified invention may be patentable if it is commercially successful and the previously
known version was not. Nevertheless, current U.S. law on this subject has several confusing and
undesirable features.204 The law requires a “nexus” to exist between the alleged invention and
the invention’s commercial success.205 The application of that “nexus” test is fraught with
uncertainty and, if the commercializer’s real contribution lies merely in testing the commercial

(1997). Boyd’s analysis differs significantly from ours because she argues that patents would be helpful where commercial
success is uncertain as a result of the risk aversion of potential commercial innovators. See id. at 337–38. Our analysis does not
depend on risk aversion, but instead focuses on the possibility that second and subsequent movers can free-ride on first-movers’
market experiments by copying successes while avoid failures. See supra Part III. Boyd considers the issue only in the context
of biotechnology inventions. See Boyd, supra, at 312-13. We believe that the problem is more general.
203

See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) (listing “commercial success” among secondary factors in considering

whether patent is obvious or not); see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007) (reaffirming obviousness
test in Graham); ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 736–57 (3d ed. 2002) (noting that secondary
factors, or “objective indicia,” play essential role in 35 U.S.C. § 103 determinations). But see Robert P. Merges, Commercial
Success and Patent Standards, 76 CAL. L. REV. 805, 838–66 (1988) (arguing that commercial success may not necessarily be
result of patented technology itself, but rather of efficient and effective marketing of such technology).
204

See Reed W. L. Marcy, Patent Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement: The Effect of Inconsistent Standards Regarding

Commercial Success on the Individual Inventor, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 199, 209 (1996).
205
“Commercial success is relevant because the law presumes an idea would successfully have been brought to market sooner, in
response to market forces, had the idea been obvious to persons skilled in the art. Thus, the law deems evidence of (1)
commercial success, and (2) some causal relation or ‘nexus’ between an invention and commercial success of a product
embodying that invention, probative of whether an invention was non-obvious.”
Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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viability of the product or in explaining the benefits of the innovation to the public, then the
nexus requirement may be deemed to be not satisfied.
Our analysis suggests two possible reforms in the evaluation of commercial success as a
secondary consideration in the nonobviousness inquiry. First, the courts should consider only
the commercialization efforts of the patentee or parties licensed by the patentee to justify a
finding that the patent was nonobvious. If the defendant in an infringement trial or a third party
engaged in successful commercialization of a patent without a patent’s protections against
second-movers, then the patent cannot be defended as necessary, at least in part, to encourage
investment in commercialization.206 Such an inference will not always mean that the patent
should be held invalid, especially if there is evidence that the defendant or third party learned of
the technology through the patent itself or the patentee’s disclosures. But the theory of market
experimentation at least could operate at the margins of patent law to favor those who
commercialize over those who do not. In otherwise close cases (and cases in which secondary
considerations become relevant tend to be close), it may be sensible to decide against a patentee
who has not engaged in commercialization and in favor of a defendant who has. At the very
least, a patentee ought not benefit from the weak inference that a defendant’s commercial
success establishes nonobviousness.
Second, courts should not discount findings of commercial success merely because that
commercial success resulted from marketing expertise rather than technological skill by the
patentee. We concede that the courts’ desire not to count commercial success resulting from
marketing excellence is somewhat supported by the theory that patents are aimed at producing
206

We do not mean to imply that independent invention always signifies obviousness. Different parties may hit on a

nonobvious invention at the same time. For an argument that independent invention should be a defense to patent infringement,
see generally, Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006).
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valuable technical information. Under that theory, commercial success may indicate that the
patented good sits in a niche in product space,207 indicating the likelihood of some important
technical difference between the patent and other products. Nonetheless, the line between
technological and marketing prowess can often be a fine one,208 and marketing can sometimes be
successful in helping to illustrate, for customers, the distinctiveness of a particular product.
Once again, our claim is not that marketing expertise alone should be sufficient to generate a
patent under current U.S. law, but that in close cases, socially useful market experimentation at
least ought not count against a patentee.209

207

Industrial organization analysis frequently makes use of the concept of multi-dimensional product space, in which each

product’s location depends on its unique characteristics. See, e.g., Andrew S. Caplin & Barry J. Nalebuff, Multi-Dimensional
Product Differentiation and Price Competition, 38 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 129 (1986) (seeking to develop multi-dimensional
location model).
208

Consider, for example, the envelopes that NetFlix uses to send and receive DVDs to and from its customers. U.S. Patent No.

6,966,484 (filed Sept. 16, 2002). One might characterize these envelopes either as a technological feat or as marketing genius.
209

Unlike the United States, at least one country seems more open to the possibility of allowing patents based merely on

commercial nonobviousness. India’s newly amended patent statute provides that the standard of patentability, or inventive step,
can be satisfied by a feature of an invention that either involves a “technical advance” or has “economic significance.” The
Patent (Amendment) Act, 2005 § 2(1)(ja) (Gazette of India Manual of Patent Practice and Procedure), available at
http://www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual-2052005.pdf.

Commentators are divided as to the intended doctrinal

significance of this change. Compare Manoj Pillai, India: India’s Patents Bill, 2005—Is It TRIPS Compliant (Mar. 31, 2005),
available at http://www.mondaq.com/i_article.asp_Q_articleid_E_31717 (“By bringing ‘economic significance’ under the
definition of ‘non-obviousness’ what has been fundamentally diluted is a cardinal principle of patent law!”) with Archana
Shanker, What Patent Owners Need to Know, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Patent Focus 2005, at 50(“Such a definition
is more or less well accepted internationally and in all probability the term economic significance might be interpreted as
synonymous to industrial application.”). The invention still is required to be “not obvious to a person skilled in the art,” but the
structure of the statute suggests that the nonobvious quality may be economic or technical. This statutory language at least opens
the possibility that patents could issue on technically trivial variations of prior art if the modified invention is successfully
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We conclude our analysis of the patent system by asking the daring question whether the
U.S. patent system be modified to provide rewards solely for the commercialization without
rewarding pretenders? We believe that current patent doctrine does have some flexibility to
achieve this end, though we worry that the institutional structure of the system may be poor at
identifying examples of commercial nonobviousness.210 A pure theory of patents for market
experimentation would permit not only patents on smallish variations of previously failed
innovations (which current law already does in part), but also patents on products that are not
novel but have never been effectively commercialized. Consider a prophetic invention that was
previously patented but never commercialized. The patent has now expired. Black-letter patent
law precludes a new patent from claiming precisely the same invention, but patent law also
allows attorneys to be creative in drafting patent claim language to avoid prior art.211 The
attorney defines “novelty” in the drafting of the claim. This feature of patent law holds out the
theoretical possibility that the attorney could distinguish noncommercialized prior art by
restricting a claim to the “successfully commercialized” product.

commercialized and if that economic success would have been nonobvious to a person of skill in the art.
210

It is difficult enough for the patent office to handle its workload in identifying technological obviousness. The PTO has

issued more than one million patents over the past seven years; it took more than 75 years after the office was created for its first
million patents. See Table of Issue Years and Patent Numbers, for Selected Document Types Issued Since 1836 (available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/issuyear.htm). Patent examiners spend only about eighteen hours on each
patent and the bonus system rewards examiners for issuing as many patents as quickly possible. Mark A. Lemley, Rational
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1500 (2001). Given its large workload and the small amount of time
spent on each patent, the PTO is probably not equipped to effectively implement a new system to determine commercial
nonobviousness.
211

See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
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One famous and analogous example of such artful claim drafting is found in the patent at
issue in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co.212 The case involved a patent claim to a
purified natural substance (adrenaline). The claim was attacked as invalid because the substance
itself was naturally occurring and therefore, the argument went, the patent claim was not novel.
In rejecting that argument, Judge Learned Hand reasoned the claim to the purified natural
substance should be recognized as novel because it was “for every practical purpose a new thing
commercially and therapeutically.”213 Hand stressed that there were “ample practical differences”
between the claimed purified substance and the prior natural substance, and that the line between
the novel and not novel should be “drawn rather from the common usages of men than from nice
considerations of dialectic.”214 Judge Hand’s reasoning now undergirds entire fields of patenting;
for example, most patents on DNA are claimed in the Parke-Davis format.215 Recognizing a
claim to a “commercialized” product as novel despite an earlier patent or other document
disclosing the precise same product would be no more doctrinally difficult than the step taken by
Judge Hand in Parke-Davis. Commercialized inventions are “for every practical purpose a new
thing commercially” even if the prior art discloses an uncommercialized version of identical
technology.
Admittedly, courts might well reject such an approach, perhaps on the ground that it
would effect a major change to the patent system rather than simply an accommodate a new
212
213
214
215

189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
Id. at 103.
Id.
After Parke-Davis, courts have recognized patents on other naturally occurring products in a purified or created form. DNA

patent claims, for example, are drafted to “clearly define an isolated and purified DNA molecule.” Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the
Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707, 741 (2005).
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technology, as in Parke-Davis.216 Moreover, if the patent system were to permit patents on
commercially new and nonobvious developments, it would need to ensure (1) that such
developments really were commercially nonobvious and (2) that the patentee (or the patentee’s
licensee) actually bore the risks of commercialization. The latter restriction may be the easier of
the two to achieve.

Where a patentee has obtained a patent on the grounds that

commercialization of the product is the difficult and nonobvious step, the patent could be
invalidated if the patentee did not engage in commercialization.217 In such a case, the courts
would refuse to recognize the patentee as the true “inventor” of the commercialized version.
Similarly, if other parties engaged in commercialization in parallel with the patentee, those
parallel efforts would provide strong evidence that commercialization was not risky and the
economic prospects of the commercialized product were not nonobvious.
Despite these limitations to existing patent doctrine, “commercialization patents” could
still produce economic harm if the patent office were generally unable to identify instances of
commercial nonobviousness. If the patent office issued patents on developments that could

216

The Parke-Davis approach, however, should be recognized in a subset of cases in which the inventor’s achievement is in

identifying a naturally occurring phenomenon for market experimentation. Consider, for example, Allerca’s identification of cats
that have a mutation that prevents them from producing dander and thus causing allergies. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Cat Lovers
Lining Up for No-Sneeze Kitties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005. On our view, Allerca should be able to patent the cats that have been
screened and commercialized, not just the test for identifying such cats.
217

Even this inquiry might be difficult, because patentees might seek to engage in minimal commercialization just to preserve

their patent rights.

See Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV.

(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 41, on file with author). Pseudo-commercialization might be harmful both because it might
involve wasteful expenditure and because it might succeed in converting a true commercial innovator into an infringer. Courts
would thus need to ensure that the patentee engaged in sufficient commercialization to produce a conclusion on whether
commercialization was economically feasible.
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obviously be successfully commercialized, those patents should be invalidated by the courts if
multiple parties besides the patentee engage in simultaneous commercialization. In theory, the
prospect of invalidation may be sufficient to encourage competitors to enter the market despite
the existence of the patent. But the patent may chill entry if, as seems likely, competitors view
litigation as risky and uncertain.218 A common uncertainty would be whether additional entry
occurred independent of the patentee’s efforts or as a result of the patentee’s market experiments.
And in the absence of widespread entry, a question would be whether additional entry would
have occurred but for the prospect of litigation.
Thus, commercialization patents may be economically beneficial only if the patent office
is sufficiently good at identifying instances of commercial nonobviousness.

The current

structure of the patent office, under which a single examiner evaluates the merits of an
application, seems unlikely to produce accurate judgments about market viability. Indeed
historically, the patent office has tried to avoid making judgments about marketability. A
different institutional structure might help.

The patent office is now engaged in a new

experiment to provide for “peer review” of patent applications.219 Under this method, the patent
office widely distributes patent applications by posting them on the Internet.220 In theory then, the
218

Patent litigation is already notoriously uncertain. Claim construction disputes are not finally resolved until the parties are

before the Federal Circuit even though parties are required to fully litigate their claims either through trial or summary judgment
prior to proceeding to the Federal Circuit in the first place. See Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in
Patent Litigation: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 203–09 (2001)
(discussing uncertainty associated with claim construction).
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See Pilot Concerning Public Submission of Peer Reviewed Prior Art, Official Gazette Notice (USPTO June 6, 2007),

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2007/week26/patsuba.htm; http://www.peertopatent.org (last visited Aug. 13,
2007).
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office could receive comments on the patent applications from a large variety of sources.221 A
similar system might be much better at generating information concerning commercial
nonobviousness. Indeed, the applications that under our current system might evoke guffaws
from peer commentators may be precisely the ones that the patent office should grant, if the
peers’ ridicule stems from a shared belief that the subject matter in the application is
commercially fanciful.
In general, we believe that the proposed modification of the patent system to allow for
some “commercialization” patents holds sufficient promise that it should be considered in some
cases where the hurdles to commercialization seem particularly daunting. An initial experiment
could be limited to a particular market area in which experiments seem especially unlikely in the
absence of patent protection.222 Nevertheless, we recognize that the patent system may not be the
optimal system for encouraging market experimentation and that given institutional realities,
patent protection could well do more harm than good.
V. CONCLUSION
We have argued that technical and market experimentation are parallel phenomena, both
underprovided in the absence of property rights. Why then have intellectual property practice
and theory focused on the former to the near exclusion of the latter? A partial answer, we
believe, lies in Harold Demsetz’s general theory of property rights.

Demsetz noted that

“property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become

221
222

Id.
Karen Boyd argues that biotechnology is one such area. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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larger than the cost of internalization.”223 Rights in technological innovation may have developed
later than rights in real and personal property because intellectual property rights are more
amorphous and the “cost of internalization” is therefore higher. Rights in market innovation may
be more amorphous still, and the costs associated with any attempt by government officials to
delineate these rights individually might have greater costs than benefits.

With growing

economies, however, the benefits of potential market innovation should increase over time, and
improved legal technology holds the promise of decreasing the cost of internalization. As the
possibility of institutions that can efficiently identify market innovation comes closer, theorists in
turn should expand their models to incorporate all the types of information that intellectual
property in theory could protect.
A market experimentation theory does not, however, necessarily lead to more and more
expansive theories of intellectual property. The current intellectual property doctrine shows that
the courts and the legislature are sympathetic to the plight of first movers who engage in risky
market experimentation.

If this desire to foster market experimentation is more explicitly

recognized, then courts and legislatures may be better able to tailor the law. As we have shown,
more explicit recognition of market experimentation might limit copyright terms, decrease a the
injunction rights of a patentee who did not commercialize vis-à-vis an infringer who did, and
invalidate “paper patents” that claim trivial technological changes never commercialized by the
patentee.
Just as it would be surprising if intellectual property doctrine did not already encourage
market experimentation to a limited extent, so too would it would be surprising if a few doctrinal
223

Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 349 (1967); see also id. (“Increased

internalization, in the main, results from changes in economic values, changes which stem from the development of new
technology and the opening of new markets, changes to which old property rights are poorly attuned.”).
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tweaks could provide close to optimal levels of experimentation. A likely reason for the law’s
relative lack of attention to market experimentation is that the relevant institutional players, such
as patent examiners, legislators, and judges, are not well positioned to make judgments about
what market experiments deserve protection. We should expect instead that when we do try to
imagine institutions that would provide appropriately tailored rights protecting market
experimentation, these institutions would be very different from existing ones. Perhaps, they
may even be sufficiently radical that we can imagine them being implemented only in countries
in which the need is particularly great,224 or in societies comfortable with novel legal
mechanisms.

224

See supra notes 50 to 52 and accompanying text (discussing literature on need for intellectual property innovation in

developing countries.
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